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I. INTRODUCTION
As we gather at this Symposium to probe the definition of
democracy in the coming century, it seems fitting to note that we are
continuing a very old political conversation rather than initiating a
new one. The meaning of democracy has long been contested.1 One of
the most vexing aspects of the debate has always centered on whether
and how to limit the majority's prerogative to act in ways that disadvantage minorities. 2 Viewed from a different angle, the question is
how to configure the relationship between majority preferences and
equality norms. It is the basic dilemma of democratic equality: What
kind and measure of equality does democracy require? Formal political equality alone? Social, economic, or cultural equality as an aspect
of political equality? On what basis?
Although a topic of lively debate among political theorists,
these questions by no means constitute a purely academic exercise.
Constitutional law regularly enters this debate as courts confront
laws that reflect, create, or entrench social inequality, by which I
mean group-based social subordination, stigmatization, or disadvantage. When courts decide whether majoritarian laws of this kind
violate constitutional equality norms, judges necessarily-if only
tacitly-join the enterprise of negotiating the relationship between
democracy and social equality. Cases involving a range of constitutional provisions might be understood to pit democracy and social
equality against one another, 3 though none quite as conspicuously as
equal protection cases. At least since the appearance of the famous
footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 4 the intersection of democracy and social equality has been a controversial one in
1.
See generally Philip Green, "Democracy" as a Contested Idea, in Philip Green, ed.,
Democracy: Key Concepts in CriticalTheory 2-22 (Humanities Press, 1993).
2.
See generally John W. Chapman and Alan Wertheimer, eds., NOMOS
=XXII
Majoritiesand Minorities (New York U., 1990).
3.
Consider, for example, a law prohibiting Medicaid funding of abortions, which implicates (among others) the right of privacy, see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312-318 (1980), or
a law denying unemployment benefits to Native Americans who were fired from their jobs
because they ingested peyote in a religious ritual, which implicates freedom of religion, see
Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-82
(1990). In neither of these cases did the Supreme Court sustain, the constitutional claim
asserted. Harris, 448 U.S. at 318; Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. Both decisions may be seen as
undermining social equality because they disadvantage historically marginalized groups.
4.
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Footnote four significantly influenced constitutional
theory by linking defects in the political process to the legitimacy of heightened judicial scrutiny
of legislation. The footnote's third paragraph is most relevant to the dilemma of democratic
equality. It suggested the possibility of judicial solicitude for "discrete and insular minorities"
who may be subjected to prejudice, and for "particular religious, or national or racial minorities"
who might be targeted in statutes. Id. (citations omitted).
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constitutional law, and its contours remain unsettled. Footnote four's
vision of democratic equality has gone largely unrealized. 5 And, apart
from scattered assertions by various justices simply pronouncing
democracy to be inconsistent with discrimination without explaining
why, 6 the Supreme Court has never elaborated a clear conception of
democratic equality within the context of its equal protection
decisions.
Last term's pathbreaking decision in Romer v. Evans7 poses in
especially high relief the dilemma of democratic equality. Romer was
the Court's first foray into applying the Equal Protection Clause to
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, groups long burdened by a legacy of
both legal and social inequality. By a six-to-three majority, Romer
struck down on equal protection grounds an expansively wordeds
amendment to the Colorado Constitution that, at the very least
sought to bar any governmental entity in the state from protecting
gays, lesbians, or bisexuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation. "Amendment 2," enacted in 1992 by voter initiative, would
have wiped out existing city ordinances barring discrimination based
on sexual orientation, prevented state lawmakers from legislating
against such discrimination in the future, and, perhaps, limited even
the ability of state courts to entertain discrimination claims of any
kind pressed by gay claimants.

5.
See generally Thomas W. Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice" Law, Politics,and
Philosophy 71-101 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1995).
6.

Assertions of this kind are particularly common in the context of race discrimination

cases. See, for example, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630-31 (1991) ("If our
society is to continue to progress as a multiracial democracy, it must recognize that the automatic invocation of race stereotypes retards that progress .... "); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of

Consent 133 (Yale U., 1975) ("[D]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral,
unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of democratic society."); Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 209 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) ("A sound democracy
cannot allow [race] discrimination to go unchallenged."); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree
has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life."). Compare Daniel v. Paul, 395

U.S. 298, 306 (1969) (construing public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and quoting presidential statement that "no action is more contrary to the spirit of our
democracy and Constitution-or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen who seeks only
equal treatment-than the barring of that citizen from restaurants, hotels, theatres,
recreationalareasand other public accommodations and facilities").
116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996).
7.
8.
The scope of the contested provision dominated the questions at oral argument and
was vigorously debated between the majority and dissenting opinions. See notes 66-68 and
accompanying text. I discuss at length the difficulty of interpreting voter-enacted initiatives in

Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "PopularIntent" Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy,
105 Yale L. J. 107 (1995).
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The apparent tension between social equality and democracy
in Romer is not subtle: by a margin of 54% to 46%, a voting majority
sought to disqualify gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from securing
legislative protection from discrimination. The question for the Court
was whether the electorate was free to impose upon a sexual minority
a categorical disqualification imposed upon no other group. The
Romer majority answered in the negative. Score one for social
equality, zero for democracy? Certainly that is how Justice Scalia
sized it up in a dissenting opinion that can only be called blistering,
even by recent standards of contentiousness on the Court. Repeatedly
invoking claims about democracy, Justice Scalia pronounced it "most
unlikely that any multilevel democracy can function under [the]
principle" adopted by the majority opinion.9
Contrary to Justice Scalia's characterization, I argue in this
Article that Romer should be read to vindicate both democracy and
social equality, and to suggest some new directions in thinking about
the dilemma of democratic equality. I find in Romers approach to gay
inequality and Amendment 2's exclusionary aspiration the traces of
intriguing new insights about the problem of democratic equality.
Most centrally, Romer's logic suggests ways in which we might view
the democratic enterprise in a wider frame by expanding democracy's
domain to encompass-for some purposes and in some ways-the
social sphere, what Romer calls the terrain of "ordinary civic life."
Some of the broad ideas I distill from Romer can help us begin to
sketch a more fluid conception of collective self-government, one that
spills over the conventional boundaries placed around formal political
institutions to embrace a more expansive, less purely institutional,
understanding of core democratic concepts like participation,
deliberation, and representation. To a greater degree than the ideas
about democratic equality that inspire familiar political and constitutional theories, the approach that Romer invites points in some
promising new directions in thinking about democratic equality.
It may seem curious to read Romer as a case about democratic
theory. For one thing, the Romer opinion is strikingly enigmatic in
ways that make it perilous to venture strong claims about what the
case means. 10 For another, the majority opinion did not explicitly
invoke the idea of democracy and, indeed, conspicuously abandoned
the "political process" reasoning that the Colorado Supreme Court
used to invalidate Amendment 2. This political process theory was
9.
10.

Romer, 116 S. Ct at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See note 65 and accompanying text.
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expressly cast in the vocabulary of democracy, and held that because
Amendment 2 selectively placed civil rights protections based on
sexual orientation outside the reach of the legislature, it unfairly
limited gay and lesbian participation in the ordinary political process.
I will argue that the Supreme Court's retreat from process theory
should not be taken as a retreat from democratic theory. Instead, the
Court's objection to Amendment 2, while not expressed in terms of
democratic theory, in fact centrally implicates ideas about
democracy's domain. Whatever the subjective intention of the justices
who joined the Romer majority opinion, I will argue that the case is
best understood as expressing important principles of democratic
equality.
In Part II, I discuss the background of discrimination against
gay men and lesbians, anti-gay-rights initiatives, Colorado's
Amendment 2, and the Romer litigation. In Part III, I set out two
traditional approaches to the democratic equality problem, consider
how we might understand Romer in terms of these two approaches,
and then criticize both as problematic. In Part IV, I outline the contours of a different approach, one that provides a normative foundation for Romer that is grounded in democratic theory and that distills
from the distinctive character of gay inequality some larger insights
about the problem of democratic equality.

II. AMENDMENT 2 AND ITS BACKGROUND
Antidiscrimination laws like those that Amendment 2 sought
to outlaw have been a principal legislative remedy sought by advocates of gay equality since the inception of the contemporary gay
rights movement over twenty-five years ago." The effort to secure the
enactment of gay civil rights laws 12 like these persists today, having
recently found its way for the first time to a floor debate in the United
States Senate. 3 In the next section, I briefly review the history of the
ongoing debate about gay civil rights legislation and anti-gay-rights
initiatives. Because understanding this history requires understanding something about the distinctive dynamics of gay inequality and

11. See generally Barry D. Adam, The Rise of a Lesbian and Gay Movement 122-28
(Twayne Publishers, 1995).

12. When I refer to "gay civil rights laws" in this Article, I specifically mean antidiscrimination laws of this kind, rather than laws providing any type of gay rights.
13. See Eric Schmitt, Senators Reject Both Job-Bias Ban and Gay Marriage, N.Y. Times
Al (Sept. 11, 1996).
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the impetus for legal protections against discrimination, I first look at
the character of gay inequality.
A. Amendment 2 in Context: The Characterof Gay Inequality
Many date the birth of the contemporary gay rights movement
to a 1969 riot prompted by repeated police harassment of gay patrons
in a Greenwich Village bar known as Stonewall. 14 Since the Stonewall
uprising, advocates of gay equality have achieved important
victories-legal, political, and cultural. 15 But some twenty-seven
years after Stonewall, powerful legal and social markers of lesbian
and gay inequality remain entrenched.
In several areas, gay men and lesbians are unequal in both a
formal and a legal sense-that is, the inequality is explicitly reflected
in governmental commands. These contexts of formal legal inequality
16
include, most prominently, criminal, family, and military law.
Moreover, in the most important pre-Romer Supreme Court decision
on gay issues, Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of criminal antisodomy laws as applied to same-sex
partners.1 7 Currently, several states criminalize only same-sex
sodomy.18 In other states where sodomy is illegal without regard to
the gender of those who engage in it (as it was under the statute
upheld in Bowers), the government enforces or defends the law, if at
all, only with respect to gay sex acts. 9 This constitutional perogative
to criminalize consensual gay sodomy has, in turn, provided
justification for other anti-gay policies, including the policy enforcing
formal gay inequality in the military, where by law, revealing one's
20
homosexuality continues to result in a discharge from service.

14. See generally Martin Duberman, Stonewall (Dutton, 1993).
15. For a comprehensive overview, see William B. Rubenstein, ed., Cases and Materialson
Sexual Orientationand the Law (West, 2d ed. 1997).
16. These are not the only areas where legally imposed or legally sanctioned inequalities
exist. Consider, for example, the rise of rules and policies outlawing gay clubs or gay-positive
curricula in public schools. See generally Carolyn Moreau, Coming Out of the Closet: Schools
Address Homosexuality, Hartford Courant Al (July 7, 1996).
17. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
18. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 531, 538-39 (1992)
(noting that since 1973, eight states have amended their antisodomy statutes to cover only
activity between same-sex partners).
19. See Evan Wolfson and Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in Our Bedrooms,
Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21
Fordham Urban L. J. 997, 997 (1994).
20. On the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, see David Cole and William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive)
Conduct, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 319, 319-22 (1994).
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In the most high-profile area of contemporary debate, family
law likewise relegates gay men and lesbians to formal inequality. No
state has yet permitted gay men and lesbians to marry,2 1 and this ban
on same-sex marriage packs a powerful legal punch. It works to deny
a forbiddingly long list of legal rights and benefits to gay men and
lesbians. Some are intangible, like the community recognition afforded marriage and denied gay unions. Others are quite concrete
and implicate rights governed by tort, inheritance, tax, criminal,
immigration, benefits, and other areas of law.22 The ban on marriage
and the corresponding lack of domestic partnership benefits in most
jurisdictions and workplaces, for example, produces substantial
employment discrimination that is widely tolerated under current
law. In some circumstances, the denial of equal employment benefits
for gay partners can mean that gay employees earn fully thirty
And this marital
percent less than a married colleague. 23
discrimination shows little sign of abating. To the contrary, fearing
that Hawaii might soon legalize gay marriage and ignite a national
chain reaction, Congress recently enacted by an overwhelming
majority its first-ever legislation to proactively relieve states of any
obligation that the Full Faith and Credit Clause might impose upon
them to recognize actions taken by another state. This "Defense of
Marriage Act" not only licenses states to ignore same-sex marriages
performed in other states, but also denies recognition of same-sex
24
marriage for purposes of federal law.
Marriage law, moreover, is not alone in powerfully
disadvantaging gay men and lesbians in family matters. Several
states also limit the rights of gay men and lesbians to be parents,
either by banning gay men and lesbians from adopting children or
serving as foster parents, 25 or by applying rules for custody and
26
visitation that penalize and disadvantage gay parents.
21. Hawaii appears poised to become the first. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d
44, 68 (1993) (subjecting statute prohibiting gay marriage to "strict scrutiny" test).
22. See Rubenstein, Sexual Orientation at 752 (cited in note 15) (discussing legal rights
and benefits dependent upon marriage).
23. Leonard Novarro, Balanced Benefits, Coverage Urged for Partnersof Gay Employees,
San Diego Union and Tribune Cl (Nov. 4, 1995).
24. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
25. See Rubenstein, Sexual Orientationand the Law at 846 (cited in note 15) (noting that
New Hampshire and Florida expressly ban lesbian and gay adoption and foster parenting).
Compare In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis.2d 492, 516 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 1994) (holding that lesbian
partner of child's lawful parent may not adopt under state adoption law).
26. See, for example, Rubenstein, Sexual Orientationat 810 (cited in note 15) (noting that
a few courts take the position that "homosexuality alone is a per se reason for denying custody
or visitation rights," and that others have used the ostensibly less discriminating "nexus" test to
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These legal inequalities are formidable, but they are matched
and sometimes exceeded by daunting social inequalities. In many
quarters, gay men and lesbians remain the object of intense social
hostility. Political scientist Kenneth Sherrill recently analyzed a
decade's worth of responses to the American National Election Study's
questions asking respondents to assess their feelings toward various
groups. 21

The

survey uses a "feeling thermometer" to probe

sentiments about a range of groups, including "Blacks," "Whites,"
"Jews," "People on Welfare," "Illegal Immigrants," "Immigrants," "Gay
Men and Lesbians," and "Christian Fundamentalists."28 Across four
separate surveys spanning a decade, gay men and lesbians were consistently at or near the bottom, registering the "coldest" or near"coldest" temperature of all the listed groups. Only the group identified in the survey as "Illegal Immigrants" earned worse or similar
scores. Moreover, Sherrill's analysis of this data reveals that the
social hostility recorded in these surveys is not concentrated in a
small anti-gay cohort, but finds widespread expression. 29
These election surveys ask respondents only about the relatively diffuse subject of their "feelings," but other survey data suggest
that social antipathy for gay men and lesbians is also reflected in the
alarmingly high rates of anti-gay hate crimes and harassment. High
percentages of gay and lesbian respondents in several surveys report
that they have been physically assaulted, pelted with objects,
threatened with violence, and/or subjected to harassing anti-gay epithets. 30 Anti-gay harassment and violence can be particularly acute in

high schools, creating excruciating conditions for gay youth. 31 And
suicide rates among gay teenagers are notoriously high.32

restrict a gay parent's rights based on a finding that the parent's homosexuality adversely
affects the child's welfare).
27. Kenneth Sherrill, The Political Power of Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals, 29 PS:
Political Science & Politics 469, 470 (1996).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See generally Kevin T. Berrill, Anti-Gay Violence and Victimization in the United
States: An Overview, in Gregory M. Herek and Kevin T. Berrill, eds., Hate Crimes: Confronting
Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men 19-25 (Sage Publications, 1992); Anthony S. Winer,
Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 387, 401-419
(1994).
31.
For a good overview, see Donna Dennis and Ruth Harlow, Gay Youth and the Right to
Education, 4 Yale L. & Pol. Rev. 446 (1986). For a disturbing example of one high school
student's experience, see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
32. See Rubenstein, Sexual Orientationat 289 (cited in note 15) (reprinting excerpt of Paul
Gibson, Gay and Lesbian Youth Suicide, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services Youth
Suicide Report 110 (1989)).
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This climate of animus and fear, combined with the very concrete legal disadvantages and disqualifications that may accompany
coming out as gay, unsurprisingly inhibits gay self-identification and
makes many people afraid to reveal themselves as non-heterosexual.
This invisibility has high personal costs for those who live a life thus
restrained. 33 It also has high aggregate costs for gay men and lesbians, whose social presence is obscured and sometimes erased entirely
under the force of this pressure. Gay inequality is thus critically
structured and given shape by a legally and socially coerced marginalization and invisibility.
It would, of course, be inaccurate and ahistorical to view the
legal and social status of homosexuality as static over time. Since the
Stonewall riots, a lot has changed, and gay men and lesbians have
become distinctly more visible in American life. More gay people have
come out, and more gay images appear in various media. To some
extent, the higher profile of homosexuality in American culture surely
is due to legal reforms that gay advocates have won in various
jurisdictions. 34 These include the repeal or invalidation of sodomy
laws; the reform or inclusive interpretation of adoption, visitation,
and custody laws; the enactment of domestic partnership laws; the
repeal of federal immigration law expressly banning immigration by
gay citizens of other countries; and, most significant for our purposes,
the enactment of laws banning discrimination based on sexual
orientation in various public and private sector arenas. 35
Significant as the legal reforms and cultural changes over the
last twenty-five years have been, we would make a critical mistake to
equate these developments with the disappearance or even inevitable
decline of the legally-and socially-coerced invisibility I have
described. To the contrary, the increasing gay and lesbian presence in
public life has triggered a powerful response from forces determined
to reinforce the regime of invisibility. Many contemporary debates
33. An excellent source on this point is Gregory M. Herek, Stigma, Prejudice,and Violence
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, in John C. Gonsiorek and James D. Weinrich, eds.,
Homosexuality: Research Implicationsfor PublicPolicy 60, 73-75 (Sage Publications, 1991). See
also Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation,Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 237, 323-27 (1996) (reviewing social science literature).
34. I explore the roles of, and relationships between, cultural and legal strategies for gay

equality in Jane S. Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a PostCivil-Rights Era, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 684 (1997) (reviewing Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normak
An Argument About Homosexuality (Knopf, 1995); Urvashi Vaid, Virtual Equality:

The

Mainstreamingof Gay and Lesbian Liberalism (Doubleday, 1995)).
35. See generally Rubenstein, Sexual Orientation(cited in note 15). The Hawaii Supreme
Court would make an important addition to this list if it invalidates that state's law limiting
marriage to heterosexuals, as many expect. See note 21.
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about gay equality can be best understood as struggles about this
regime. Consider the closet-codifying "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in
the military,3 6 the fervent opposition to permitting openly gay
marchers in St. Patrick's Day parades, 37 and the growing attempts to
banish materials about homosexuality from schools or school
curricula. 38 At its core, each is an attempt to suppress the visibility of
homosexuality in public life. Consider, as well, common arguments
that gay men and lesbians can effectively opt out of any
discrimination simply by "choosing" the closet and thus conspiring in
their own invisibility. In upholding the constitutionality of a local
initiative similar to Amendment 2, the Sixth Circuit invoked this line
of argument:
Many homosexuals successfully conceal their orientation. Because homosexuals generally are not identifiable "on sight' unless they elect to be so identifiable by conduct (such as public displays of homosexual affection or self-proclamation of homosexual tendencies), they cannot constitute [a class meriting
heightened constitutional protection] ....
39

Arguments similarly asserting the protective virtues of the closet
have been pressed even in defense of anti-gay violence. For example,
in a recent case involving the liability of school authorities for an
ongoing pattern of violence and harassment targeted against a high
school student, one school official apparently told the victim and his
parents that he should expect such incidents because he is "openly"
gay. 40 This official's logic vividly illustrates how a climate that sanctions anti-gay violence creates a crude, yet quite potent mechanism
for coercing gay invisibility. As psychologist Gregory Herek has
observed in studying anti-gay hate crimes, "[b]y alternately denying
and stigmatizing homosexuality, ['cultural heterosexism'] creates the

36. See note 20.
37. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115 S.Ct.
2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995) (upholding, under the First Amendment, the right of parade
organizers to exclude Irish gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from St. Patrick's Day parade).
38. See note 16.
39. Equality Foundationof Greater Cincinnati,Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,54 F.3d 261, 267
(6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S.Ct. 2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1996). Precisely
this logic lies at the heart of the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. It also regularly surfaces in the
context of gay civil rights debates. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the
States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 283, 299, 313-17
(1994) (noting harmfulness of the closet and the benefits of visibility).
40. Nabozny, 92 F. 3d at 451. After remand and a jury trial on the question of liability,
the case settled for a substantial sum. See Gay Bashing Case Settles, Nat'l L. J. A8 (Dec. 2,
1996) (reporting a settlement of $900,000 plus up to $62,000 in medical expenses).
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conditions under which lesbians and gay men can be routinely
4
victimized." 1
The idea that invisibility is a comfortable option readily available to those who want to avoid discrimination misconceives the
dynamics of gay inequality by missing the central point: Coerced
invisibility is a principal form of anti-gay discrimination. Far from
being a benign safety net, the closet reflects the particular way in
which gay men and lesbians are coerced to live in conditions not
imposed on heterosexuals and to participate in maintaining the
circumstances that sustain their own inequality.
In sum, post-Stonewall developments reflect an intense struggle over the legitimacy of suppressing gay presence in public life. The
regime of coerced gay invisibility I have described has come to be
sharply contested, both by those gay men and lesbians who seek to
dislodge it, and by those opponents of gay equality who seek to entrench it. The power of measures like Amendment 2, I will argue, lies
in their capacity to reinforce the invisibility regime.
B. Contested Remedies: Gay Civil Rights Laws, Anti-Gay-Rights
Initiatives,and the Passageof Amendment 2
Against this defining background of coerced invisibility, we can
begin to understand the battle over enactment of public- and privatesector laws banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in
employment, housing, public accommodations, education, credit, insurance, real estate, and other areas. Because of the many spheres of
collective life that can be encompassed by antidiscrimination laws,
and the ways in which the protections afforded by these laws can
encourage gay people to self-identify, these laws have long formed a
centerpiece in the organized campaign for gay equality.
The first municipality to adopt a measure banning discrimination based on sexual orientation was East Lansing, Michigan in
1972.42 Since then, some one hundred sixty-five municipalities have
adopted similar measures. 43 In 1982, Wisconsin enacted the first

41. Gregory M. Herek, The Social Context of Hate Crimes: Notes on Cultural
Heterosexism, in Gregory M. Herek and Kevin T. Berrill, eds., Hate Crimes: Confronting
Violence Against Lesbians and Gay Men 101 (Sage Publications, 1992). On the links between
anti-gay violence and anti-gay subordination more generally, see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the
Privacy Principle,92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1461-92 (1992).
42. Human Rights Campaign, The State of the Workplace for Gay and Lesbian Americans:
Why Congress Should Pass the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (July 1996)
<http://www.hrcusa.org/issues/workplac/enda/endarept.html>.
43. Id.
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statewide antidiscrimination law, and it has since been joined by
eight other states and the District of Columbia." The battles surrounding enactment of these laws have frequently been bitter, with
initial legislative passage often representing round one, and a ballot
measure to repeal the legislation round two. 45 This pattern dates to

Anita Bryant's "Save Our Children" effort, launched in 1977, to repeal
an antidiscrimination ordinance adopted in Dade County, Florida. 46
The first statewide anti-gay-rights initiative to repeal a gay civil
rights measure was Oregon's Measure 8, passed by that state's voters
in 1988.47 Measure 8 repealed a gubernatorial executive order
banning discrimination based on sexual orientation. 48
Since the passage of Oregon's Measure 8, several more measures hostile to gay civil rights laws have made their way to statewide
ballots. 49 Yet 1992 marked an important turning point. That was the
year that both Colorado's Amendment 2 and Oregon's Measure 9 went
to the voters. Although there were significant differences between the
Colorado and Oregon measures, they shared an important characteristic. In neither state had the legislature yet passed a statewide gay
civil rights law. Instead, both ballot measures sought to repeal
existing local gay civil rights measures, and proactively to prevent the
state legislature from enacting any statewide antidiscrimination law
in the future. This preemption strategy ushered in a new genre of
measures that, rather than waiting for the enactment of state laws,
sought to head legislatures off at the pass. 50

44. The additional states are California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
See Developments in the Law-Employment
Discrimination,109 Harv. L. Rev. 1568, 1625-26 (1996); Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at
286-88 (cited in note 39).
45. See generally Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 288-90 (cited in note 39).
46. Id. at 284 & n.10.
47. Id. at 288.
Ten years earlier, an anti-gay-rights initiative called the '"Briggs
Amendment' appeared on the California ballot, but it did not seek to repeal an enacted antidiscrimination measure. Instead, it would have empowered school boards to fire or refuse to hire
teachers for "soliciting, imposing, encouraging, or promoting homosexual conduct." Id. at 288 &
n.34. With opponents as diverse as Ronald Reagan and Jerry Brown, the Briggs Amendment
was defeated. Id. at 288.
48. Id. at 288 & n.5.
49. For a listing of similar initiatives in other states, see Thomas E. Baker, U.S. Supreme
Court; Exiling Homosexuals from State Politics; The High Court Faces a Dilemma on Colorado's
Anti-Gay-Rights Law, Texas Law. 34 (October 9, 1995). For cases prohibiting anti-gay-rights
initiatives from appearing on the ballot based on state-law restrictions, see Collins v. Secretary
of Commonwealth, 407 Mass. 837, 556 N.E.2d 348 (1990); In re Advisory Opinion to the Attorney
General-RestrictsLaw Related to Discrimination,632 So.2d 1018 (Fla. 1994).
50. A measure recently defeated by Maine's voters also took a proactive approach. See
Bob Sipchen, Maine Voters Reject Rights Referendum, L.A. Times A12 (Nov. 8, 1995).
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Although 1992's Colorado and Oregon measures shared this
characteristic, in another respect they sharply differed. The language
of the Oregon measure directly targeted and impugned homosexuality, requiring government entities to teach that homosexuality is
"wrong, unnatural, and perverse." 51 Colorado's Amendment 2, in
contrast, did not expressly condemn homosexuality, but employed this
distinctly more muted language:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct or practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim any 52
minority status, quota preferences,
protected status or claim of discrimination.

Turning away from the harshly anti-gay rhetoric that had characterized previous initiative battles, the campaign for Amendment 2 emphasized a "no special rights" theme that has since become a principal
rallying cry for opponents of gay civil rights laws. 53 Rather than attacking homosexuality per se, many of Amendment 2's proponents
stressed the illegitimacy of antidiscrimination laws covering sexual
orientation. They argued that statutory protection is unwarranted
because gay men and lesbians are insufficiently "like" other legally
protected groups and because sexual orientation is insufficiently "like"
other widely protected aspects of identity. 54 Building on this com-

51.

Measure 9 provided in relevant part as follows:
(1) This state shall not recognize any categorical provision such as "sexual orientation," "sexual preference," and similar phrases that includes homosexuality, pedophilia,
sadism or masochism. Quotas, minority status, affirmative action, or any similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of conduct, nor shall government promote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties and monies shall
not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or
masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments, agencies and
other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Education and the
public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth that recognizes
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and
perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged and avoided.
Oregon Laws 1995, ch. 1.
52. Rorner, 116 S. Ct. at 1623.
53. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate Over Lesbian
and Gay Civil Rights, 9 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 137 (1995); Schacter, 29 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 293-94 (cited in note 39).
Oregon Laws 1995, ch. 1.
54. I discuss what I have called this new "discourse of equivalents" at greater length in
Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 283 (cited in note 39).
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parative structure, the "special rights" idea holds that gay men and
lesbians neither "need" nor "deserve" the protection of antidiscrimination laws legitimately enacted to protect other groups, and the attempt to secure legislative protection thus amounts to a grab for privilege and advantage.
As I have previously argued at length, the coded rhetoric of
"special rights" permits opponents of gay rights to tap into deep and
powerful reservoirs of social anxiety and anger about other
antidiscrimination
laws
based
on
race,
gender,
and
disability-particularly affirmative action measures-even as these
opponents claim to champion existing civil rights protections. 55 This
represents a significant tactical shift, although it by no means filtered
out of the Amendment 2 campaign all anti-gay rhetoric or animus,
much of which was simply rechanneled into the new comparative
arguments. For example, the leader of the Amendment 2 campaign
argued that "gays are one of the most privileged groups in the
country" and that "militant gays would create a whole new protected
class of affluent, well-educated, sexually deviant power brokers. The
true meaning of civil rights would never be the same." 56 Perhaps
reflecting an assumption that the tactical shift in Colorado was a wise
one that may have explained why Amendment 2 won, while the
Oregon measure lost, post-Amendment 2 ballot initiatives became
even more muted. An unsuccessful 1995 statewide initiative in
Maine, for example, did not mention homosexuality at all; instead, it
enumerated all the categories already protected under Maine's
antidiscrimination law and forbade the state legislature from adding
57
any new categories.
C. The Romer Litigation
Shortly after Colorado citizens approved Amendment 2 by a
54% to 46% margin, its constitutionality was challenged on several
grounds. The trial judge issued an order enjoining the measure's
enforcement, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld that injunction
("Evans "). A trial was held on the constitutionality of the initia-

55.
56.

Id. at 300-07.
Will Perkins, Views on Gay Rights Conflict, Denver Post 1D (Oct. 11, 1992).

57.

See Sipchen, L.A. Times at A12 (cited in note 50). This strategy emulated a tactic

used in Florida. The Florida measure never made it to the ballot because the Florida Supreme
Court found that it violated that state's "single subject rule." See In Re Advisory Opinion to

Attorney General, 632 So.2d at 1019-20.
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tive, 58 and Amendment 2 was struck down as a result. The case then
returned to the Colorado Supreme Court.
In its final decision ("Evans I'), the Colorado Supreme Court
relied on the political process theory that it had first set out in the
Evans I opinion sustaining the injunction. The court's theory was
that Amendment 2 triggered strict scrutiny not because sexual
orientation is a suspect classification, but because the initiative
unconstitutionally infringed the "[fundamental] right to participate
equally in the political process." 59 Amendment 2 did so, held the
court, "by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of
persons... ."60 The court went on to elaborate its political process
theory, explaining that Amendment 2
bars gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals from having an effective voice in
governmental affairs insofar as those persons deem it beneficial to seek
legislation that would protect them from discrimination based on their sexual
orientation. Amendment 2 alters the political process so that a targeted class
is prohibited from obtaining legislative, executive, and judicial protection or
redress from discrimination absent the consent of a majority of the electorate
through the adoption of a constitutional amendment. Rather than attempting
to withdraw antidiscrimination issues as a whole from state and local control,
Amendment 2 singles out one form of discrimination and removes its redress
61
from consideration by the normal political processes.

In support of this theory, Evans I relied upon cases about voting
rights and election law, 62 as well as cases placing limits on the use of
direct democracy.63
The most important case relied upon by the Colorado court,
one from this second line of cases, was the Supreme Court's decision
in Hunter v. Erickson.64 Hunter invalidated an Akron city charter
amendment that would have prevented the city council from
implementing any ordinance regarding discrimination in housing
based on race, religion, or ancestral origin unless the council first
obtained a majority vote in a referendum. The Evans I opinion relied
58. At trial, testimony was taken from a wide array of witnesses, including some prominent classical philosophers who faced off on how to interpret ancient Greek texts on homosexuality. See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the Looking Glass: Politics,
Morality and the Trial of Colorado'sAmendment 2, 21 Fordham Urban L. J. 1057, 1070, 1078-79

(1994).
59.

Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1339 (Colo. 1994) ('Evans 1") (quoting Evans v.
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo. 1993) C'Evans1")).
60. Id. (quoting Evans I, 854 P.2d at 1282).
61. Id. (quoting Evans 1, 854 P.2d at 1285).
62. Evans I, 854 P. 2d at 1277-78.
63. Id. at 1279-82.
64. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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upon broad language in Hunter about the unconstitutionality of
disadvantaging "any particular group" in the political -process.
Hunter's meaning had been sharply contested in the Evans litigation.
Colorado had argued for a narrow reading of the opinion's language
referring to "any particular group," treating Hunter, in which the
plaintiff was African American, as a race case. The state read Hunter
to apply only to groups already protected by strict scrutiny based on
the separate suspect classification branch of equal protection doctrine.
The plaintiffs, by contrast, situated Hunter within a line of cases
concerned not specifically with race, but with group-based burdens on
access to the political process that trigger strict scrutiny independent
of race-based classifications.
D. The Romer Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari seemed likely to clear
up the ambiguities in Hunter and the boundaries of equal protection
doctrine protecting rights of participation in the political process. The
six-justice Romer majority did not do so. Instead, the Court invoked a
single, spare phrase in declining both to rely and to comment on the
political process theory in its opinion. 5 Exactly what the Court
substituted in place of the Colorado Supreme Court's political process
theory is far from obvious on the face of the opinion, and this question
seems destined to generate extended commentary. The notion that
the future reveals what happened in the past always has force when
it comes to saying what a case "means," for meaning is forged as legal
texts are applied and interpreted over time. But this idea seems
especially true in the case of the elusive Romer opinion, which is as
notable for what it did not say as for what it did. I distill from the
majority opinion four central points that provide a framework for
exploring the case.
1. The Sweep of Amendment 2: "Ordinary Civic Life"
The majority opinion heavily emphasized the sweeping breadth
of Amendment 2. The opinion is not long, but Justice Kennedy
65. The opinion first distinguished the two lines of cases marshalled by the Colorado
Supreme Court in support of its political process theory, characterizing one line as "voting rights
cases," and the other as "precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of governmental
decisionmaking." 116 S. Ct. at 1624 (omitting citations). The majority then simply noted,
without commenting upon the reach or meaning of these cases, that it was affirming the
judgment below, "but on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Supreme Court."
Id.
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devoted a significant portion of it to this point. He characterized the
terrain covered by Amendment 2 as embracing "an almost limitless
number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic
life in a free society." 66 The opinion carefully catalogued the many

private- and public-sphere activities as to which gay men and lesbians
could seek no legal protection from discrimination, pointing to public
accommodations, private and government employment, housing,
health and welfare services, insurance, and real estate. All of these
areas were, or could have been, the subject of municipal
antidiscrimination laws that extended to sexual orientation.
Moreover, the Court did not regard these identified spheres of
"ordinary civic life" as exhausting Amendment 2's reach. Pursuing a
theme foreshadowed by several questions asked in oral argument,
Justice Kennedy's opinion also raised (but did not resolve) the
possibility that the provision was so broad as to bar gay claimants
from asserting rights under laws that make no mention of sexual
orientation, including laws of general application, like laws forbidding
"arbitrary discrimination. 6 7
Justice Kennedy then juxtaposed
Amendment 2's expansive reach with the narrowness of the class on
which it was focused, noting that the amendment paradoxically
"identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection
68
across the board."
2. Caste and the Unequal Protection of the Laws
Signalling another point of emphasis in the decision, Justice
Kennedy began by dramatically quoting Justice Harlan's Plessy v.
Ferguson dissent for the principle that the Constitution "neither
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens."69 Stressing the way that
Amendment 2 singled out lesbians, gays, and bisexuals for explicitly
disfavored legal treatment, the majority opinion characterized the
provision as a "disqualification of a class.., unprecedented in our
jurisprudence,"7 one that sought simply to make homosexuals

66.

Id. at 1627 (emphasis added).

67. Id. at 1626. At the argument, several justices had queried Colorado's counsel about
Amendment 2's potential reach. The justices asked, for example, whether Amendment 2 would
permit public libraries to refuse to lend books to a gay patron or public hospitals to limit kidney
dialysis to heterosexuals. See Tony Mauro, This Argument Shed Little Light, Legal Times 8
(Oct. 23, 1995).
68. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
69. Id. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
70. Id. at 1628.
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"unequal to everyone else."71 Justice Kennedy repeatedly returned to
the claim that Amendment 2 was sui generis in the far-reaching
restrictions that it sought to impose only upon a single class of
citizens.7 2
The opinion underscored Amendment 2's caste-like
character by focusing on the formally unequal tiers of access to
protective laws that the measure sought to codify 3
In pursuing this theme, the justices in the majority appear to
have been influenced by the argument offered by five prominent
constitutional law professors who filed a brief amicus curiae.7 4 This
amicus brief argued that Amendment 2 amounted to a per se violation
of the Equal Protection Clause, one so literal as to require no inquiry
into the applicable level of scrutiny. The idea was that just as a state
could not categorically disqualify one class of citizens from the
protection of robbery or assault laws, so it was also inconsistent with
the phrase "equal protection of the law" to make the protection of
antidiscrimination laws off limits to a single group. Even if a state
has no constitutional obligation to enact particular protective laws,
the brief argued, it still may not, through the state constitution, limit
who is eligible even to seek that legal protection. The majority
opinion seemed to echo this point, albeit tersely and in somewhat
cryptic terms, when it said, "[a] law declaring that in general it shall
be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek
aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the
75
laws in the most literal sense."
A closely related point, of course, lay at the heart of the political process theory relied upon by the Colorado Supreme Court. The
core of that theory was that it was unfair to subject one group to a
substantially more burdensome set of procedures (securing a constitutional amendment) than those available to everyone else (securing a
piece of legislation). But the Romer majority declined to embrace that
doctrinal expression of the point, perhaps fearing that to do so would
cast doubt on too many policy decisions made through state constitu-"
tional amendments that have the effect of remitting adversely af-

71. Id. at 1629.
72. See, for example, id. at 1625, 1627.
73. For arguments placing an anticaste principle at the center of equal protection analysis, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("There is no caste here."); Cass R.
Sunstein, The PartialConstitution (Harvard U., 1993); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 107 (1976).
74. See Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland,
and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Romer v. Evans, 116 S.
Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855 (1996) (available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
75. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added).
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fected groups to the amendment process for relief. The Court also
rejected the unabashed proceduralism of the Colorado Supreme
Court's opinion in favor of the per se argument, which can more read76
ily be characterized as either substantive, procedural, or both, and
which, in any event, offered a more textually grounded way to address
Amendment 2's unseemly hierarchy of equal protection rights and
access to antidiscrimination laws.
3. Animus and Irrationality
A third principal point in the opinion relates to the justification and motivation for Amendment 2, which the Court addressed in
applying the rational basis test. Although the opinion neither raised,
nor claimed to resolve, the larger question of what level of scrutiny is
appropriate for sexual-orientation-based classifications, the Court
applied a rational basis standard to Amendment 2. The state had
argued that several rational bases supported Amendment 2, including
conserving the limited resources said to be available to enforce
antidiscrimination laws; protecting the privacy and associational
interests of landowners and religious institutions who do not want to
open their facilities to gay men and lesbians; and securing the
efficiency benefits of adopting a single statewide 77policy on gay civil
rights laws rather than permitting local variation.
Focusing on the "sheer breadth"78 of Amendment 2, the Court
found its sweep to be "so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it
that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests. 7 9 Notwithstanding the notoriously forgiving
quality of the rational basis standard and the exceedingly rare
judicial willingness to find laws wanting under it,80 the Court could
find no justification for Amendment 2 other than anti-gay animus,
and thus deemed the measure irrational.

76. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
77. See Brief for Petitioners at 41-48, Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855
(1996) (available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Briefs File).
78. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1627.
79. Id.
80. The notable exceptions in the Supreme Court are Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and U.S. Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), cases in
which the Court applied a distinctly more demanding version of the rational basis test to
invalidate restrictions on group homes for people with mental retardation, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at
446-50, and food stamp eligibility for unrelated members of the same household, Moreno, 413
U.S. at 534.
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A doctrinal puzzle created by the rational basis discussion in
the case may offer some guidance about the scope of the Romer animus principle. The puzzle is why the Court applied the rational basis
test at all. Given the opinion's apparent embrace of the claim that
Amendment 2 represented a "literal" equal protection violation, 81 it is
unclear why the court regarded itself as compelled to designate any
level of scrutiny. Entrenched as that habit is in the Court's equal
protection jurisprudence, the theory that Amendment 2 violated the
plain terms of the Equal Protection Clause would seem to have obviated the need to conduct a level of scrutiny inquiry, as the amicus
brief laying out the theory had indeed argued.8 2 The fact that the
Court nevertheless applied rational basis as the standard of review in
this case raises the question whether the "literal violation" and
"animus" rationales are independent or interdependent. If they are
independent of one another, why did the Court invoke both? If they
are interdependent, in what sense?
Whether independent or interdependent, it seems fair to conclude that the qualities that make Amendment 2 violate the literal
terms of the Equal Protection Clause-the unalloyed attempt to deny
gay people ordinary access to antidiscrimination remedies-undermined the law's rationality and thus supported the animus finding.
That is, notwithstanding the uncertain relationship between these
two rationales, it seems fair to draw from Romer at least this conclusion: laws reflecting so clear a desire to exclude and subordinate gay
men and lesbians will be regarded with suspicion, even under the
normally toothless rational basis review.
Indeed, Romer's "animus" principle holds enormous promise
for future gay equality litigation and could prove to be the decision's
doctrinal blockbuster. But its meaning is uncertain. For one thing,
the opinion invites interpretation about what constituted the anti-gay
animus that doomed Amendment 2. Does the animus finding depend
upon Amendment 2's breadth? If so, how will the Court measure the
breadth of other anti-gay laws such as the ban on same-sex marriage,
which seems destined to reach the Supreme Court before too long?
On the one hand, denying gay people the right to marry is a more
targeted prohibition than the sprawling Amendment 2. On the other
hand, marriage laws are themselves striking for their breadth if one

81.
82.

See notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
See Amicus Brief at 3 (cited in note 74).
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focuses on the formidable array of legal rights and benefits that flow
83
from marriage.
The opinion also raises, but does not answer clearly, the
critical question whether intolerance of homosexuality framed in
terms of traditional values is the same thing as anti-gay animus.
That is, when the majority opinion condemns Amendment 2 as
unacceptably motivated by animus and the dissent defends it as
84
wholesomely inspired by "moral disapproval of homosexual conduct,
are Justices Kennedy and Scalia describing the same attitude but
reaching different conclusions about the constitutional implications of
this attitude? If so, then Romer spells very big trouble for anti-gay
measures of all kinds, which are regularly defended in the name of
traditional moral values. As Bowers v. Hardwick reflects,85 in other
doctrinal contexts the Supreme Court has frequently been willing to
accept as the governmental justification for anti-gay laws nothing
more precise, targeted, or verifiable than a cursory, seemingly selfjustifying
reference
to
this
traditional
condemnation
of
homosexuality. After Romer, it appears that something more than
bare condemnation of homosexuality must be marshalled in defense of
anti-gay measures challenged on equal protection grounds, but the
opinion does not delineate exactly what that something is.
4. Rejecting "Special Rights"
The fourth point central to the majority's opinion is its apparent rejection of the "special rights" argument that has been the signature slogan of the organized opposition to gay civil rights for the last
several years. The special rights idea, enthusiastically embraced in
the dissent as an accurate description of Amendment 2, is
representative of a contemporary species of political argument that
invokes "special" as a term of opprobrium and appeals to a thin, but
apparently beguiling, idea of egalitarianism.
The Court's observations on this issue came in the context of
considering whether Amendment 2 might be constitutionally salvageable if read to bar only laws that protect against discrimination based
on sexual orientation, as opposed to the broader reading of
Amendment 2 as barring protection for gay men and lesbians under
even laws of general application.86 On this point, the Court said that
83.
84.
85.
86.

See
See
See
See

note 22 and accompanying text.
note 114 and accompanying text.
notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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even if only sexual-orientation-specific laws were embraced by
Amendment 2, the claim that such laws conferred "special rights"
could not save it. First, the Court found that what was objectionably
"special" was not the protections of antidiscrimination law, but the
substantial and unique legal and political barriers erected by
Amendment 2.87 Beyond this reconfiguration of what was "special,"
the Court directly took on and rejected the logic of the special rights
idea:
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are
protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost limitless number of8 8transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary
civic life in a free society.

Many gay-rights activists will, I suspect, count this passage among
the opinion's most satisfying. Succinctly, if without helpful explication, the Court credits an idea long stressed by advocates of gay
equality: antidiscrimination measures seek equality, not privilege.
"Special" antidiscrimination laws are necessary to bring about
equality only where there is a "special" history and pattern of discrimination.
5. Weaving the Pieces Together
How do these four points cohere, or do they? Justice Kennedy
does little to link the components of the opinion into any clear, thematic rationale. Although I will reserve for the last Part of this
Article the question of what the majority opinion might offer in terms
of the dilemma of democratic equality, let me suggest at this point one
means by which we might weave together these somewhat disparate
points.
At the core of the Romer opinion seems to be a resistance to
the categorical exclusion of a targeted group of citizens from the
sphere of "ordinary civic life." 89 The decision does not mandate gay
inclusion, of course, because it does not require that any antidiscrimination laws be enacted. But it does decisively reject a legal attempt to
87. The Court said that it could not "accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on
specific legal protections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the
contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons alone. Homosexuals
are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint." Romer, 116 S.
Ct. at 1626-27.
88. Id. at 1627 (emphasis added).
89. Id.
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relegate and confine gay men and lesbians to the legal and social
margins. Thus, Romer's powerful insight is not merely to notice the
breadth of Amendment 2's exclusionary project (who could miss
that?), but to connect that project to ideas about caste and anti-gay
animus. By emphasizing Amendment 2's intrinsically caste-like
qualities (those constituting a "literal" equal protection violation) and
the anti-gay animus that inspired it (which leaves it with no rational
basis as justification), the decision invites a connection between
subordination, animus, and the social invisibility that characterizes
gay inequality, which Amendment 2 would have raised to the level of
state constitutional policy. The very connection of these elements,
moreover, underscores what is problematic about the exclusion and
subordination of gay people in ways that drain the "special rights"
idea of its force.
E. The Romer Dissent
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, is a long and bitter one. It begins
with an incendiary but seemingly misconceived German-language
reference that accuses the Court's majority of "mistak[ing] a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite."90 For reasons not explained, Justice
Scalia apparently preferred a German language word for the
American phrase "culture war" that he later twice uses in the opinion.91 The problem is that the German word does not translate as a
contemporary American-style "culture war," but is instead a specific
historical reference to the "struggle with the Catholic Church" 92 waged
by Bismarck in the late nineteenth century. This war included legislation criminalizing the discussion of public affairs by clerics and
attempting to transfer to German agencies papal jurisdiction over the
Catholic Church in Prussia. 93 The opening sentence in the dissent is
quite puzzling if the term "Kulturkampf' is understood in this light,
90. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts should not "take sides in this
culture war"); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[w]hen the Court takes sides in the culture wars").
The phrase "culture war" was made famous by, among others, presidential candidate Patrick
Buchanan's speech to the 1992 Republican National Convention in Houston. Buchanan used
the phrase to refer to contentious contemporary debates over social issues, including the place of
homosexuality in American life. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Buchanan Defends Focus on "Values"
ConservativeReassertsConvention Remarks, Wash. Post A10 (Sept. 12, 1992).
92. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945 at 262 (Knopf, 1969); Helmut
Walser Smith, German Nationalism and Religious Conflict" Culture, Ideology, Politics, 18701914 at 19-49 (Princeton U., 1995).
93. Holborn, History of Modern Germany at 262-64 (cited in note 92).
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for Justice Scalia would then be inexplicably characterizing
Amendment 2 as a state-sponsored war against the Church, which the
majority opinion has unfairly taken to be a fit of spite. It would be
surprising, to say the least, to see Justice Scalia identify homosexuals,
Amendment 2's target, with the Catholic Church, the Kulturkampf's
target. Moreover, this error, if it is one, is both strange and troubling.
Given that homosexuals were among the Holocaust's victims, a
German language reference has particularly troubling resonations
94
and is an unfortunate choice in this context.
Taking strong issue with the Court's characterization of
Amendment 2's troubling breadth, the dissent saw it as a relatively
modest measure, calling it "an entirely reasonable provision which
does not even disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but
merely denies them preferential treatment."95 In Justice Scalia's
view, the amendment put to the electorate the simple question,
"[s]hould homosexuality be given special protection?", to which the
voters answered "no."96
As this question reflects, the dissent, unlike the majority opinion, is framed in the express vocabulary of democracy. Sounding a
theme later pursued in his dissent from a decision to vacate and
remand in a constitutional challenge to a local charter amendment
banning the Cincinnati City Council from enacting gay civil rights
protections, 97 Justice Scalia strongly objected to the notion that
Amendment 2 amounted to "electoral-procedural" discrimination 98
because it removed the decision whether to enact gay civil rights
protections from cities like Aspen, Boulder, and Denver, and remitted
it to the statewide electorate.9 9 The dissesnt instead saw the
Amendment as an unobjectionable change of democratic venue that is

94. See generally Erwin J. Haeberle, Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The
Destructionof Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in Martin Bauml
Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey, Jr., eds., Hidden Front History: Reclaiming

the Gay and Lesbian Past 365-79 (New American Library, 1989) (discussing treatment of
homosexuality in Germany between 1933 and 1945).
95. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

97.

Equality Foundationof Greater CincinnatiInc. v. City of Cincinnati,116 S. Ct. 2519,

2519, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1044 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending a city charter amendment
barring municipal protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation and arguing

that it "involves a determination by what appears to be the lowest electoral subunit that it does
not wish to accord homosexuals special protection") (emphasis omitted).

98. Roiner, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Professor Zeppos suggests that a limitation of local antidiscrimination laws may raise
questions about the right to travel. Nicholas Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel,
PrematurePredation, and the Components of PoliticalIdentity, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 445, 447-50
(1997).
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fair game in a "multilevel democracy" and implicit in state constitu-

tionalism.
Beyond this structural argument for letting voters mark the
boundaries of the legal protections from discrimination available to a
specified group, Justice Scalia argued that gay civil rights questions
are not only fairly, but also wisely remitted to voters. Invoking a
populist justification for direct democracy, the dissent characterized
gay rights questions as reflecting a classic face-off between popular
and elite forces. Apparently distancing themselves from the "elite
class from which the Members [of the Court] are selected,"100 the
dissenting justices associated the view that discrimination based on
sexual orientation is wrong with a small cadre of privileged, out-oftouch interests. Along these lines, for example, the dissent ridiculed
the antidiscrimination policy adopted by the American Association of
Law Schools as a "law-school view of what 'prejudices' must be
stamped out" that stands far from the more "plebeian" views ascribed
to the electorate at large.101 Framing the battle in these terms
emphasized the wisdom of permitting voters to decide the question
and conceived direct democracy as a way for the masses to reject
views being imposed upon them by a small, concentrated elite.
Moreover, building on this charge of elitism, Justice Scalia
strongly disputed any suggestion that gay men and lesbians cannot
compete fairly in the democratic process. Taking direct aim at the
Court's characterization of gay men and lesbians as a "politically unpopular group,"10 2 and its image of Amendment 2's exclusion of gay
men and lesbians from "ordinary civic life in a free society,"'10 3 the
dissent saw gay men and lesbians at the very political and cultural
center. Consider this assertion:
"[l]t is... nothing short of
preposterous to call 'politically unpopular' a group which enjoys
enormous influence in American media and politics, and which, as the
trial court here noted, though composing no more than 4% of the
population had the support of 46% of the voters on Amendment 2."104
Along similar lines, the dissent described gay men and lesbians as "a
politically powerful minority,"'0 5 a group with "high disposable
income"106 and as possessing "disproportionate political power."10 7
100. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
103. Id. at 1627.
104. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Putting aside the inflammatory rhetoric and weak empirical
predicate for these characterizations, 108 the contrast with the majority
opinion is striking. Far from perceiving any political disadvantage or
malfunction that might justify robust judicial review, the dissent
painted a picture of elite affluence, influence, and power. The picture
strongly evokes the political arguments emphasized by Amendment
2's proponents in the electoral campaign, particularly the special
rights claim. 0 9 This characterization, in turn, is important from the
vantage point of democratic theory, for it suggests among other things
that the majoritarian political process is friendly and hospitable to
gay interests. Indeed, the special rights emphasis and the anti-elitist
theme in the dissent suggest that gay people have, if anything, excessive and unfair power that must be checked by the populace through
means of direct democracy. The dissent never reconciled this view of
vast gay political power with its later observation that gay men and
lesbians have consistently lost in Congress on civil rights questions," 0
but this notion nevertheless forms a central theme of the dissent's
argument that there is nothing undemocratic about Amendment 2.
While the dissent most strongly emphasized its defense of the
democratic process that spawned Amendment 2, the opinion also
made two other conceptual points. First, it seemed to endorse not
only the popular prerogative to decide the gay civil rights question but
also the substantive merits of the voters' decision. At various points,
Justice Scalia adopted a formal posture of substantive neutrality on
the issue of gay civil rights. Quoting from a previous decision
upholding a statute that conditioned federal voting rights on state
prohibition of polygamous cohabitation,' he noted that decision's
endorsement of traditional marriage, and added that he "would not
[himself] indulge in such official praise for heterosexual monogamy,
because [he] think[s] it is no business of the courts (as opposed to the

107. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
homosexuals have "political power much greater than their numbers").
108. For an analysis challenging the blanket characterization of gay men and lesbian as
wealthy, see Sherrill, 29 PS: Political Science and Politics at 471-72 (cited in note 27).
109. I review these arguments at length in Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 291-94

(cited in note 39).
110. The persistent loss on civil rights legislation does not stand alone in the realm of
federal legislative policy. Organized gay political interests also recently lost by a wide margin in
opposing both the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, see Clifford Krauss, With Caveat, House
Approves Gay-Troops Policy, N.Y. Times A15 (Sept. 23, 1996), and the Defense of Marriage Act,
see Schmitt, N.Y. Times at Al (cited in note 13).
111. Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Murphy v. Ramsey, 114

U.S. 15, 45 (1885)).
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political branches) to take sides in this culture war." 112 At another
point, he said that he did "not mean to be critical of [the] legislative
successes [won by homosexuals at the local level]." 113 These assertions

ring hollow, however, in light of other passages in the dissent. For
example, it is hard plausibly to view Justice Scalia as indifferent on
the place of homosexuality in American life when he says:
First, as to [Amendment 2's] eminent reasonableness. The Court's opinion
contains grim, disapproving hints that Coloradans have been guilty of
"animus" or "animosity" toward homosexuality, as though that has been
established as Unamerican. Of course, it is our moral heritage that one should
not hate any human being or class of human beings. But I had thought that
one could consider certain conduct reprehensible-murder, for example, or
polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit even "animus" toward such
conduct. Surely, that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral
disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced1 14 the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in
Bowers.

Appearing to place homosexuality on a moral par with murder, ridiculing the notion that discrimination based on homosexuality might
be deemed objectionable, 115 and evoking the "love the sinner, hate the
sin" notion associated with the Catholic Church, all belie the stance of
neutrality claimed in the dissent. Claims of substantive neutrality
seem similarly unpersuasive in light of the dissenting opinion's contemptuous incredulity at the notion that sexual orientation discrimination might be deemed to deserve the same legal treatment as discrimination based on race or religion," 6 and the seething umbrage
expressed on behalf of the voting majority that enacted Amendment
2.117

112. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1633. Elsewhere in the dissent, Justice Scalia appears to credit the view that
homosexuality is a moral scourge. See id. at 1629 (characterizing Amendment 2 as "a modest
attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the
efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws").
115. This ridicule is also evident in the passage skewering the American Association of Law
Schools nondiscrimination policy. See id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also note 101 and
accompanying text.
116. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (castigating the Court's majority for "plac[ing] the
prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to homosexuality is as
reprehensible as racial or religious bias").
117. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ridiculing notion that "animosity' toward homosexuality" is
"evil"); id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing majority of "insulting" the voters of Colorado
by "verbally disparaging [Amendment 2] as bigotry"); id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the majority's suggestion that Coloradans have "fallen victim to pointless, hatefilled 'gay-bashing' is so false as to be comical").
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A second conceptual point stressed by the dissent is a defense
of the constitutionality of Amendment 2 based on the Supreme
Court's 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which upheld the constitutionality of Georgia's antisodomy law.11S The dissent's argument on
this point was simple: if the state may constitutionally criminalize
homosexual sodomy, then it follows that the state must also be permitted to deny antidiscrimination protections to gay men and lesbians. The majority opinion conspicuously said nothing about Bowers,
and the attractive target created by that silence drew repeated barbs
from Justice Scalia. In maintaining its silence on Bowers, the justices
in the majority chose neither to expressly overrule that case (as we
may well one day say that Romer did sub silentio), nor to offer any of
several possible responses to Justice Scalia's point." 9 The majority
opinion might, for example, have noted that Bowers did not uphold
the constitutionality of criminalizing all homosexual conduct, but only
sodomy as defined by Georgia law; 20 that not all those who regard
themselves, or are regarded by others, as gay within the broad
language of Amendment 2 necessarily engage in sodomy; 12' that
Bowers might be read to apply to all sodomy prohibitions, whether
directed at homosexual acts, heterosexual acts, or both, and thus to
have no bearing on an equality-based challenge, as distinct from a
privacy-based challenge;22 or that the privacy principles at issue in
Bowers have a different purpose and scope than the equality
principles at issue in Romer.23 In the end, however, Bowers was the
case that dare not speak its name, and Romer left substantial
lingering questions about the continuing vitality of that case and thus
about Romer's own reach.124

118. Id. at 1631-33, 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). With less emphasis but no less
vociferousness, the dissent also attacks the majority opinion as fatally inconsistent with
previous rulings upholding laws regulating polygamy. Id. at 1636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. As Professor Eskridge argues in his contribution to this Symposium, the majority's
silence on Bowers may have prudential value.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy,

Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 419, 426 (1997).
120. See, for example, Feldblum, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 288-91 (cited in note 33); Hunter, 27
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 543 (cited in note 18).
121. This status/conduct distinction is reviewed at length in Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor

Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551 (1993); Janet E. Halley, Sexual
Orientationand the Politics of Biology: A Critiqueof the Argument from Immutability, 46 Stan.
L. Rev. 503 (1994); Hunter, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 543-46 (cited in note 18).

122. See Hunter, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 531-46 (cited in note 18).
123. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
RelationshipBetween Due Processand Equal Protection, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161 (1988).
124. For an early judicial reaction, see Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458 n.12 (arguing that Bowers
"will soon be eclipsed in the area of equal protection" by Romer).
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III. Two STANDARD AccouNTs OF DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY
What does Romer suggest about the dilemma of democratic
equality? How can our understanding of that dilemma be enriched by.
situating the problem of gay inequality within the framework of
democratic theory? We can put these questions in perspective by first
identifying the dominant accounts of democratic equality in constitutional theory and then exploring why neither one proves compelling.
A. ConstitutionalBrakes and Process Perfection
Two characteristic approaches to democratic equality suggest
themselves. Both accounts are such venerable parts of the constitutional canon that, for our purposes, they require little detailed elaboration. First, the most standard and straightforward account of democracy and social equality is to conceive of democracy in majoritarian terms and to embrace without apology the notion that the
Constitution imposes frankly antidemocratic limits on majority prerogatives, including the Equal Protection Clause. The famous, if
overworked, "countermajoritarian difficulty" arises because democracy is equated with majoritarianism and courts that invalidate majority-endorsed legislation are thereby thwarting the democratic will.
In a constitutional (as opposed to purely majoritarian) democracy, it is
said, courts may apply brakes on democracy because, in some circumstances, constitutional values outweigh democratic values.' 25 The majority may be thwarted in enacting legislation that creates or entrenches certain inequalities, but thwarted in the name of constitutionalism, not democracy. On this account of democratic equality, the
central question is the scope and reach of the antidemocratic trump
card. How expansive is the Equal Protection Clause and does it properly override the majority's will in a given circumstance? Because
equality norms function as a brake on democracy, we can say that this
theory sees social equality as exogenous to democracy. By contrast
only political equality is endogenous to democracy under conventional
majoritarian theory. Political equality is an open-textured concept
that is deployed by different theorists in very different ways, 126 but
Charles Beitz, a leading theorist, characterizes as the "most widely

125. On the complex tensions inherent in the concept of "constitutional democracy," see
Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand.the Rule of Law, 62 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 689, 701-06 (1995).
126. See generally Charles R. Beitz, PoliticalEquality: An Essay in Democracy Theory x
(Princeton U., 1989) ("[There is no consensus about the meaning of this principle").
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held view" the notion that "democratic institutions should provide
citizens with equal procedural opportunities to influence political
decision." 127 Thus, on the dominant view, political equality is formal,
or procedural, and focuses on institutional dimensions of the electoral
process. Requirements like universal adult suffrage or one-person,
one-vote are examples of political equality principles that are
generally viewed as endogenous to majoritarian democracy.128
Contrast a second standard view, one famously adopted in
footnote four of the Carolene Products decision and elaborated in the
subsequent work of John Hart Ely through his "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review. The Elyist approach most decisively
changes the terms of the debate and departs from the standard majoritarian/constitutionalist paradigm by reconceiving social equality
(at least in some form) as endogenous to democracy. Building upon
the judicial solicitude for "discrete and insular minorities" reflected in
footnote four,129 Ely recast constitutional equality protections as
consistent-not in tension-with democracy by identifying inequality
born of social "prejudice" as democracy's nemesis. Positing that

127. Id. at 12. Beitz goes on to criticize the traditional view "because it too readily
identifies the abstract ideal of political equality with the more precise, institutional standard of
proceduralequality and because it wrongly portrays the latter as an unambiguous and univocal
requirement" Id. at 16.
128. I intend the endogeneity/exogeneity distinction I am drawing to capture the structure
of arguments within the traditional framework of majoritarian/constitutionalist theory. It is
important to recognize, however, that political equality claims that are more aggressive than
those accepted by conventional theory may challenge this distinction for two reasons. First,
some more demanding principles of political equality can verge on, or at least implicate, ideas
about social equality. See, for example, Lani Guinier, Tyranny of the Majority: Fundamental
Fairnessin Representative Democracy 102-05 (Free Press, 1994) (arguing that the Voting Rights
Act embodies statutory norms of political equality that require representation of historically
marginalized interests). Compare J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the
First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 609, 636-42 (1982)
(arguing that free speech principles should be interpreted to permit expanded campaign finance
laws that counter wealth disparities and enhance the quality of political debate because
"equality is part of the central meaning of the first amendment"). Second, the relationship
between the Constitution and democratic theory is complex, for constitutional norms shape the
very architecture of the American political system and thus necessarily play an explicit role in
defining, rather than simply limiting,majoritarian democracy. For example, the requirements
of one-person, one-vote and universal adult suffrage-now widely acknowledged to reflect
minima of formal political equality-were imposed through the Constitution. See Jamin B.
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical,Constitutionaland TheoreticalMeanings of
Alien Suffrage, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1391, 1392 n.6, 1421 (1993). The constitutional pedigree of
political equality principles suggests, however, that not all such principles can be categorically
regarded as endogenous to majoritarian democracy, for some of these principles may be claimed
to violate majority will, and thus themselves represent constitutional brakes on majoritarian
democracy.
129. See note 4.
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"prejudice is a lens that distorts reality,"1o Ely enlisted judges in the
enterprise of political process perfection-that is, in self-consciously
correcting for the ways that prejudice compromises the democratic
process. 131 Ely counted among these compromising effects, for example, the outright exclusion or underrepresentation of certain minority
interests in "the pluralist's bazaar" that constitutes the political process, 132 and the creation of policies therefore skewed by the bias that
infects them. Seen in these terms, equality-enhancing judicial review
enables democracy rather than applies a brake on it.
Ely's approach was particularly influential and it will be the
focus in my analysis because it is paradigmatic in the way that it captures a broad conceptual approach to reconciling democracy and
equality. Ely's approach, however, is not unique in this regard.
Other theories also frame process-perfecting principles of judicial
review intended to address problems of democratic inequality. For
example, we can understand some versions of civic republicanism in
this way. Civic republicans characteristically stress the centrality of
deliberation to democracy and argue that politics should represent a
constructive, public-regarding dialogue in which all groups participate
as "political equals."' 33 Like Ely, civic republicans respond to the
pathologies they perceive in pluralist politics by generating principles
of judicial review designed to counter these imperfections, 3 4 and, like
Ely, the civic republican theories have a distinctly procedural cast. 35
Each of these two standard frameworks is problematic.
Neither, in my view, powerfully captures Romer's potential contribution to the problem of democratic equality.
B. Romer as a ConstitutionalBrake on Democracy?
Within a framework equating majoritarianism with democracy, we might understand the Romer decision as flatly antidemo130. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 153 (Harvard
U., 1980).
131. Id. at 73-104. See generally Symposium on Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later,
77 Va. L. Rev. 631 (1991).
132. Ely, Democracy and Distrustat 152 (cited in note 130).
133. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539, 1550 (1988). See
generally Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 Yale L. J. 1493 (1988) (essays
analyzing and critiquing republican model).
134. See Sunstein, 97 Yale L. J. at 1579-81 (cited in note 133).
135. See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political
Ideology, 1991 Duke L. J. 561, 568-78 (arguing the procedural character of civil republicanism).
Where Ely charges judges with locating the absence of fair representation in the political
process, the republicans ask judges to correct for the absence of the ideal political dialogue upon
which their aspirational vision of democracy is based.
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cratic because it rejected the will of the voting majority in Colorado's
1992 election, but as nevertheless justified by the force of a
countervailing constitutional principle of social equality that trumped
democracy. The majority and the dissent can be read to agree on this
conceptual approach to the question-and thus to share a perception
of social equality as exogenous to democracy-but to disagree
vigorously about whether this case presented an appropriate occasion
for applying the constitutional brake.
As a descriptive matter, this approach may well reflect how the
justices in the majority would, if asked, set out their own analysis of
democracy and equality. None of the majority's arguments was
offered as vindicating democratic values. Instead, the opinion set out
reasons why Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause and
then built a case for why the Court is justified in limiting the
electorate's prerogative. As for Justice Scalia, he could not have made
any clearer his claim that the Court's decision thwarted what he
regarded as the important democratic prerogative to choose moral
standards. The difference is that Justice Scalia thought the Court did
so without a legitimate countervailing justification.
As a normative grounding for Romer and a theory of democratic equality, however, this approach has significant weaknesses.
Even on its own terms, majoritarianism is subject to powerful critique. That is, even granting the premise that formal political equality is all that democratic theory should demand, majoritarianism is
assailable because it categorically places the imprimatur of "majority
support" on all enacted legislation without any critical inquiry about
the extent to which a law can or does necessarily reflect majority
sentiments. 136 Amendment 2 and the dynamics of direct legislation
nicely reflect why that critical inquiry is important, although direct
democracy is by no means the only context in which these problems
surface. 1'3 The process by which the electorate comes to understand
ballot measures is riddled with opportunities and incentives for strategic manipulation of information that can and does mislead voters. 138
136. For an extended analysis of the descriptive shortcomings of majoritarianism, see

Barry Friedman, Dialogueand JudicialReview, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993).
137. In the legislative context, public choice theorists have pointed out, for example, the
ways in which problems like agenda setting and cycling call into question the conclusion that
enacted legislation necessarily reflects the will of a legislative majority. See generally Daniel A.
Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev. 423 (1988).
For more general critiques of the standard equation of majoritarianism with democracy, see, for
example, Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword-TheVanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43, 7477 (1989); Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 628-53 (cited in note 136).
138. I discuss these problems at length in Schacter, 105 Yale L. J. at 107 (cited in note 8).
See also Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 Yale L. J. 1503, 1513-22 (1990)
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I have argued that anti-gay-rights initiatives like Amendment 2 are
promoted in ways that confuse voters about the effect and meaning of
the initiatives. 139 Specifically, the "special rights" theme plays on
voter confusion between antidiscrimination laws and affirmativeaction measures. 4 1
Indeed, in a recent dissertation about
Amendment 2, Evan Gerstmann studied public-opinion polling done
in Colorado before and after passage of the initiative. 4 ' That polling
revealed that, contrary to the outcome of the vote on Amendment 2,
there appeared to be high public support for the notion that people
42
should not be denied a job or housing based on sexual orientation.
Based on analysis of polling data and focus-group interviews,
Gerstmann, like several participants in the Amendment 2 campaign
whom he interviewed, linked the majority vote for Amendment 2 in
the face of this contrary data to voter antipathy for affirmative action.43 It thus appears that Amendment 2's proponents succeeded in
inducing voters to believe that Amendment 2 was principally about
affirmative action, and to conflate affirmative action with
antidiscrimination laws.
Moreover, it is problematic to regard ballot initiatives (like
other laws) as necessarily commanding continuing majority support
once they are enacted. Doing so ignores important temporal factors.
As Barry Friedman has pointed out, laws often represent, at best, a
static snapshot of public sentiment that cannot account for the ways
in which that sentiment is dynamic, changing, and always in flux.44
Given the formidable costs and difficulties associated with mounting a
ballot measure, this problem is a substantial one in the arena of direct
democracy because many questions will not be revisited at the ballot
box. 145

(criticizing the plebiscite as a means of representing the genuine voice of the people). In addition, the phenomenon of low voter turnout and high voter "drop off' on ballot questions (that is,
high rates at which voters vote for candidates on the ballot but do not vote on initiatives) raise
important questions about what a majority of voters represent a majority of.
139. Schacter, 105 Yale L. J. at 156-59 (cited in note 8); Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. at 300-03 (cited in note 39) (discussing "special rights" language as a tool used to confuse

voters).
140. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
141. Evan Gerstmann, At the Constitutional Crossroads: Gays, Lesbians and the Failureof
ClassBased Equal Protection 179-83 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison, on file with the Author).
142. Id. at 180-81.
143. Id. at 182-89.
144. See Friedman, 91 Mich. L. Rev. at 640-42 (cited in note 136).
145. See generally Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall 64-66 (Harvard U., 1989) (discussing high cost of efficient means for
securing necessary signatures to place initiative on ballot).
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But for our purposes, the far more significant problem is precisely the premise that conventional majoritarianism grants: the
premise that formal political equality is all democratic theory ought to
demand.
Defining democracy solely with reference to formal
requirements like universal adult suffrage or one-person, one-vote is
impoverished because it brackets some of the very questions that
should be central. 146
To the extent that democracy, properly
understood, depends upon some conception of political equality, it
does so in order to ensure the fair and equal allocation of
opportunities to participate in and shape collective decisions.147 But
formal political equality is a bad proxy for the equal distribution of
opportunities for democratic influence. We simply cannot know very
much about who exercises democratic influence, and to what extent, if
we insist upon indifference to the background, or substantive,
inequalities that shape political communities. Inequalities in wealth,
social power, and cultural representation bear significantly upon the
opportunity to influence collective decisions, but none of these is
noticed on the conventional account of majoritarian democracy. Put
differently, the problem with positing that democracy requires only
formal political equality is the failure to consider the conditions in
which democracy operates, and thus the failure to account for the
ways that these conditions can either enable or sabotage democratic
aspirations. Conceptions of democracy that require only formal
political equality thus suffer from the characteristic problems of
formal .equality theories more generally: failing to appreciate that
formal equality in a context of substantive inequality tends to reproduce the underlying inequalities and to make putatively "equal" opportunities much more valuable to some than to others.

146. There are, of course, vital and contested questions about what the requirements of
formal political equality should be. See notes 126-28 and accompanying text. My argument is
not intended to diminish the importance of generating more robust conceptions of formal
political equality, but only to highlight the problems of limiting the democratic inquiry to
institutional questions alone.
147. One need not accept the most demanding accounts of democratic equality to see the
power of this proposition. Consider the simple formulation of Robert Dahl, a canonical democratic theorist, in his later work examining the implications for democracy of economic inequality: "opportunities to exercise power over the state, or more concretely over the decisions of the
government of the state, are, or at any rate ought to be, distributed equally among all citizens."
Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics 325 (Yale U., 1989). For other helpful discussions,
see Joshua Cohen, Procedure and Substance in DeliberativeDemocracy, in Seyla Benhabib, ed.,
Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 95-119 (Princeton U.,
1996); Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice at 143-71 (cited in note 5).
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C. Romer as ProcessPerfection?
The Romer majority decision might alternatively be explained
as judicial process perfection in the style of Elyist representation
reinforcement. Perhaps the Court sought to even out a political process that it viewed as unfairly stacked against sexual minorities by
virtue of Amendment 2's passage.
Descriptively, it is hard to find support in the Romer opinion
for this attribution of Elyism. To the contrary, the majority was quite
explicit in rejecting the political process theory that had formed the
core of the Colorado Supreme Court's holding,148 and in doing so, the
Romer majority bypassed a clear opportunity to use Hunter to create a
doctrinal toehold for process perfection. And while Ely signed the
apparently influential amicus brief submitted by constitutional law
professors, it takes some work to convert the argument offered in that
brief into the grammar of representation reinforcement.
The
conversion works, in fact, only at a high level of abstraction. As a
matter of fair process, all groups should be unfettered in their right to
seek the equal protection of the law, and no process can be justified if
it selectively places protective laws out of the reach of disfavored
groups. But, as discussed above, the Ely construct is decidedly
procedural in nature, while the per se argument has important
substantive dimensions. The latter argument seems to place an
equality-based limit on electoral prerogatives (no categorical
disqualification from eligibility for legal protection) that applies
irrespective of the particular democratic processes that produce it and
the social status of the group that may be harmed by it.14
As a descriptive matter, it is also difficult to restate the
majority's rational basis discussion in the terms of representation
reinforcement. We might well see the majority's finding of irrational
anti-gay animus as evoking Ely's distorting lens of prejudice,150 but
nothing in the opinion characterizes this animus in terms of its
procedural effects. On the contrary, the doctrinal punch of Romer is
precisely that it seems to treat anti-gay animus, standing alone, as a
substantively unacceptable basis for laws, without regard to
procedures.

148. See note 65 and accompanying text.
149. While the character of the per se argument is not entirely clear, ifiewing it through the
lens of both substance and procedure does, at the very least, underscore that the distinction
between the two is fuzzy and subject to easy manipulation.
150. Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 153 (cited in note 130).
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Moreover, whether or not the Romer majority had any element
of Elyism in mind, the process-perfecting theory of judicial review has
its own well-rehearsed normative shortcomings. It is more attractive
than the majoritarian view because it complicates and thickens democracy by making some measure of social equality endogenous,
rather than exogenous, to democracy. Yet the approach founders on a
different axis: substance versus procedure. Ely aggressively offered
his theory in procedural terms and argued that it could be applied
without requiring judges to make value-laden substantive distinctions
that he regarded as institutionally unsuited to courts. But this is
exactly the point on which Ely has proven most vulnerable. 151 Ely has
been widely criticized for the notion that equality principles can
disclaim any substantive dimension. Several critics pursuing this line
of argument have suggested that Ely simply chose the wrong set of
substantive principles to anchor his notion of political malfunction.
By doing so, these critics have underscored- the. ways in which Ely's
vision of process is itself rooted in contestable substantive ideas. For
example, Ely focuses heavily on ferreting out illicit legislative
motives, but as Neil Komesar has argued, political malfunctions may
arise by virtue of inequalities of information, resources, or
organization, without regard to any specific showing of legislative
prejudice or ill-will toward a particular group. 52 Bruce Ackerman has
likewise argued for criteria more sensitive to structural inequalities. 153
Moreover, even taking at face value Ely's criteria for identifying process imperfections, other critics have pointed out that substantive criteria or norms must guide judges in applying the principles of
representation reinforcement and determining when a law is the
product of an Elyist distorting lens of prejudice, making it fair game
for judicial override.15 4 Romer, in fact, draws us back to Laurence
151. See Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuinga Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of Process
Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 721, 722 n.6 (1991).
152. Komesar also criticizes Ely on other grounds. He argues that structural inequalities
can create both majoritarianand minoritarianforms of bias, and challenges Ely for addressing
only the problem of powerless minorities (majoritarian bias), while ignoring the problem of
powerful minorities (minoritarian bias). Komesar also faults Ely for looking only at the defects
in the political process, while failing to undertake a comparative institutional analysis that also
considers defects and limits in the adjudicative process. See Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect
Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 198-215 (U. of
Chicago, 1994).
153. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 713 (1985)
(arguing that diffuse and anonymous groups can require more judicial solicitude than the
discrete and insular groups of footnote four).
154. See Ortiz, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 742-44 (cited in note 151) ('Any attempt to identify process
imperfections ultimately must employ substantive judgments."); Richard Davies Parker, The
Pastof ConstitutionalTheory-And Its Future,42 Ohio St. L. J. 223, 236-39 (1981); Laurence H.
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Tribe's well known critique of Ely's proceduralism, in which Tribe
argued that substantive criteria are needed to distinguish between
homosexuals (who pose a strong case for representation-reinforcing
judicial review) and burglars (who do not).155 The Romer dissent
might be read to restate this "burglar" problem as the "murderer,"
"animal abuser," or "polygamist" problem. Recall Justice Scalia's
argument that political majorities ought to be as free to condemn
homosexual conduct as they are to condemn murder, animal cruelty,
or polygamy. 56 By raising these putative parallels, albeit not in the
context of an Elyist argument, Justice Scalia recalls Tribe's critique of
Ely: courts cannot avoid making substantive distinctions by seeking
refuge in value-free procedural ideas, and the application of proceduralist rules requires drawing value-laden lines. 15
'
As Justice
Scalia's argument suggests, moreover, the inevitability of drawing
value-laden lines is not limited to the context of Elyist argument.
Although different doctrinal frameworks and conceptual structures
may be advanced to resolve constitutional questions about laws creating or maintaining gay inequality, none convincingly allows courts
entirely to sidestep questions of substance.
The problem with Ely's equality principle, in other words, is
that its assertedly procedural character leaves it without an answer
to the cases of animal abuse, murder, and polygamy invoked by
Justice Scalia. A strong theory of democratic equality needs a framework for addressing issues like these. A robust egalitarian democracy
may, indeed, marginalize and disadvantage murderers as a group, but
only for defensible reasons. Substantive distinctions are unavoidable.
Some lines that courts might draw between homosexuality and the
other contexts raised by Justice Scalia are morally agnostic
(emphasizing Mill's "harm" principle); 8s others are rooted in
conceptions of morality denominated as such (emphasizing the social

Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 Yale L. J. 1063,
1075-76 (1980).
155. Tribe, 89 Yale L. J. at 1075-76 (cited in note 154). Along similar lines, see Paul Brest,
The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio State L. J. 131, 135-37 (1981) (discussing burglar and
homosexual distinction).
156. See note 114 and accompanying text.
157. To the extent that the brief submitted by Tribe and other constitutional law professors
is properly characterized in proceduralist terms, see notes 148-49 and accompanying text, it is
an ironic turn given Tribe's well-known critique of Ely as avoiding the resort to substance that
Tribe argued to be inevitable.
158. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 92 (Penguin, 1978) (arguing for liberty where "a
person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself').
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good and moral value of homosexual love).159 The framework most

appropriate for making these distinctions should, in my view, resist
the inevitability of a sharp dichotomy between these two lines of
It ought to be relevant to equality principles that
inquiry.
homosexual love both lacks Millian negative qualities (because the
case for its "harm" to the community is weak) and strongly furthers
positive, constitutive values in the lives of gay men, lesbians, and the
community of which they are a part. Undoubtedly, some boundary
questions are more complex than others. For example, animal abuse
and murder are more obviously distinguishable from homosexuality
than is polygamy, although there are powerful distinctions to be made
in the case of polygamy given the historical linkage between polygamy
and equality-undermining patriarchy.160 But for our purposes, the
important point is that it is a fair critique of Ely that his failure both
to acknowledge the necessary resort to substance and to elaborate his
guiding substantive commitments leaves his theory of representation
reinforcement deficient as an approach to democratic equality.161
IV. A DIFFERENT DIRECTION: EXPANDING DEMOCRACY'S DOMAIN

Against these two standard accounts, Romer can point us in
some new directions for thinking about democratic equality. The
distinctive dynamics of gay inequality, when considered within a
framework of democracy, reveal some important but underdeveloped
ideas by throwing into relief the democratic implications of social
159. See, for example, Feldblum, 57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 330-34 (cited in note 33) (arguing the
moral virtues of homosexual love); Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:"
Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 533-38 (1989) (setting out the line of argument
that "articulates the virtues of homosexual intimacy").
160. If polygamy is viewed entirely in the abstract, and as a matter of sexual autonomy and
personal choice, it might be appropriately analogized to homosexuality or, more specifically, to
same-sex marriage. But ignoring the context in which polygamy has been practiced would
obscure crucial points. As Maura Strassberg has recently noted, the history of polygamy is
overwhelmingly one of polygyny (men with multiple wives), not one of polyandry (women with
multiple husbands), and polygamy has most frequently been part of strongly patriarchal systems and inspired by overtly patriarchal norms. Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or
Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage(forthcoming 1997). Framing polygamy solely in the abstract terms of liberty therefore masks the inequalities that have accompanied its use and the ways in which polygamy has been enmeshed with problems of gender
subordination. This context makes it highly problematic to protect polygamy in the name of
equality ideals and suggests some fundamental differences between homosexuality and polygamy.
161. Many of these same problems surface in debates of political theory about substantive
versus procedural conceptions of democracy, and there is considerable overlap. See generally
Cohen, Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy, in Benhabib, ed., Democracy and
Difference at 95-119 (cited in note 147).
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exclusion. I have discussed the principal existing approaches in terms of
My
two axes:
endogenous/exogenous and procedural/substantive.
analysis has found the two standard approaches wanting, and has
suggested the promise of seeing social equality as endogenous to
democracy (unlike the constitutional brake framework, but like the
process-perfection approach), and as a matter of substantive and not
exclusively procedural democratic commitment (unlike either the
constitutional brake or process-perfection frameworks).
Let me suggest a third axis: one that distinguishes between
democracy's vertical and horizontal dimensions.162 In the sense in
which I use the word, "vertical" questions focus on what democratic
theory requires in core elements of the formal political process. Last
term's cases about voting rights 163 and campaign finance,164 for example, represent vertical inquiries that test the depth of principles
about fair representation and election procedures, institutional principles that are widely regarded as central to the democratic process.
Indeed, the Hunter political process theory relied on by the Colorado
Supreme Court likewise concerns a vertical dimension of democracy.
Contrast with this vertical perspective a horizontal inquiry, one that
engages the question of democracy's domain and explores the role of
democratic ideas and practices in social spheres of collective life
beyond the political process. The horizon I have in mind radiates
from the formal, institutional, political process and reaches social
aspects of our collective public life that we conventionally distinguish
from politics. 65 Unlike the earlier distinctions (exogenous/endogenous
and substance/procedure), this one should not be regarded as an
either/or proposition. The vertical dimensions of democracy are
plainly central to any serious discussion, and, indeed, I do not mean
to suggest that the vertical dimensions of democracy are unimportant
in the struggle for gay equality. Instead, this distinction is useful not

162. These terms are alluded to in Simon, Democracy and Social Injustice xx-xxi (cited in
note 5) (distinguishing between "the vertical depths" and the "horizontal sweep" of democracy).
163. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 135 L. Ed. 2d 248 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894
(1996).
164. Colorado RepublicanFederal CampaignCommittee v. FederalElection Commi'n, 116 S.
Ct. 2309, 135 L. Ed. 2d 795 (1996).
165. On the centrality of a public/private distinction in theories of liberal democracy, see
David Trend, Democracy's Crisis of Meaning, in David Trend, ed., Radical Democracy 11
(Routledge, 1996). Much of what I say in this section also has relevance for the market, which
is similarly subject to a horizontal democratic analysis of this kind. For an exploration of economic inequality and democratic theory, see Joshua Cohen and Joel Rogers, On Democracy:
Toward a Transformation of American Society 47-71 (Penguin, 1983). Although economic
inequality is relevant to the lives of many gay men and lesbians, I do not focus on it here because it is not a characteristic that unites the group in the way that coerced invisibility does.
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only in understanding Romer but in highlighting that there are
horizontal dimensions of democracy that are easily obscured by the
habits of an exclusively vertical focus.
Viewed in the horizontal perspective, Amendment 2 is objectionable because it is an engine of social disenfranchisement. It entrenches the legally and socially coerced invisibility, as well as the
associated subordination and stigmatization, of gay men and lesbians.
This disenfranchisement has democratic implications which, once
identified, suggest some important insights about democratic equality. We can distinguish two distinct senses in which the social disenfranchisement of gay men and lesbians undermines democratic equality; one is relatively modest, the other more bold. Each reflects a
separate horizontal dimension of democracy, and I want to defend
both.
First, social disenfranchisement corrodes the fairness of the
political process by selectively hampering the ability of gay citizens
and groups to achieve or influence preferred political outcomes. This
claim about democracy's horizontal dimensions is relatively modest
because it links social inequality to the formal political process.
Maintaining a social regime of coerced gay invisibility inhibits and
burdens political organization and advocacy because it prevents gay
men and lesbians from demonstrating their political strength in the
ways that interest group politics has traditionally rewarded. In his
critique of the constitutional protection afforded only "discrete and
insular" minorities under the Carolene Products formula, Bruce
Ackerman argued that homosexuals, as an anonymous minority, are
politically disadvantaged in potent ways by that anonymity; gay
political organizers must induce "each anonymous homosexual to
reveal his or her sexual preference to the larger public and to bear the
private costs this public declaration may involve." 166 To borrow Robert
Dahl's formulation
about economic
inequality, the social
disenfranchisement of gay men and lesbians thus leads to unequal
distribution of "opportunities to exercise power over the state."167
This first horizontal dimension of democracy should not be
highly controversial. Indeed, even Justice Scalia seems tacitly to

166. Ackerman, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 731 (cited in note 153). See also Hunter, 27 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. at 547-48 (cited in note 18). Compare Sherrill, 29 PS: Political Science and Politics
at 472-73 (cited in note 27) (exploring the political "[c]osts of [b]eing [b]orn into a [d]iaspora").
167. See note 147 and accompanying text. Kenneth Sherrill expresses this in terms of
lacking access to political "resources." Sherrill, 29 PS: Political Science and Politics at 469
(cited in note 27) ("[The] quest for political power is disadvantaged by barriers to the formation
of political community as well as by lack of access to significant power resources.").
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accept the proposition that factors like cultural or economic power are
relevant to questions of democratic fairness. His reference to asserted
gay "influence" in the media, though caricatured and provocative,
signals an implicit recognition that social factors matter in measuring
political power.
Indeed, if this were the extent of democracy's horizontal dimensions, then Ely also had this perspective. Recall his emphasis on
how prejudice "distorted reality" and thus undermined a fair political
process. 68 But Ely's horizontal perspective was both limited and
flawed. By limiting his analysis to instances of bad legislative motives, he missed structural factors that, quite apart from discrete
instances of ill will, limit the political resources and opportunities
available to groups. Invisibility burdens gay political organizing and
strength, in other words, in ways that do not depend upon showing
bad legislative intentions in a particular case. 69 Similarly, by justifying his theory solely in proceduralist terms, he failed to ground his
approach in its necessary substantive commitments. 170 This void left
his theory unable to offer any framework by which gay claims to social
equality could be distinguished from similar claims made on behalf of
burglars (or polygamists, or others). 171 The approach I am sketching,
by contrast, accepts the need to draw value-laden lines within a guiding vision of social equality.
The second horizontal dimension of democracy reflects a more
controversial idea. There are ways in which the social sphere can
itself be conceived as a political domain and thus have neglected
implications for democratic ideas and practices. 72 The regime of

168. See notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
169. See Ackerman, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 731 (cited in note 153); Komesar, Imperfect
Alternatives at 60 (cited in note 152) ("The behavior of massive and complex social institutions is
only tenuously related to the motives of the individual participants.").
170. Some versions of civic republicanism may likewise be criticized for failing to acknowledge and engage questions of substance. For a critique along these lines, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism,97 Yale L. J. 1713 (1988).
171. See notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
172. Arguments to extend the scope of democratic theory and practice in this direction may
be found in Seyla Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the
Political (Princeton U., 1996) (collecting essays exploring the reach and contours of democratic
theory); Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and PoliticalTheory (MIT Press, 1992)
(arguing for democratization of civil society); Chantal Mouffe, Radical Democracy or Liberal
Democracy?, in David Trend, ed., RadicalDemocracy (Routledge, 1996) (calling for "extension of
the democratic ideals of liberty and equality to more and more areas of social life" and arguing
"to use the symbolic resources of the liberal democratic tradition to struggle against relations of
subordination in not only the economy but also those linked to gender, race, or sexual
orientation, for example"). Many political theorists exploring the horizontal reach of democracy
respond to or build upon the influential work of Jfirgen Habermas, and particularly Habermas's
concern with the processes of "political opinion-and will-formation." Jilrgen Habermas, Between
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coerced gay invisibility helps to reveal these implications by drawing
our attention to the difficult question of what it means to be governed.
Democratic theory, though contested and fractured in contemporary
debates, has at its core some notion of consensual, collective selfdetermination about the rules and norms under which citizens live. 173
The dynamics of gay inequality suggest that, contrary to conventional
political theory, laws and formal policies are not the only communal
judgments that operate to shape people's lives in powerful ways, and
thus should not be uncontroversially regarded as the only forms of
governance that implicate democratic ideals. Laws are coercive in
unique and sometimes brutal ways, 174 but they do not exhaust the
universe of collective social regulation. Social norms and the cultural
meanings that are attached to particular actions and identities also
have regulatory qualities. These non-legal forces powerfully affect
people's lives, both indirectly (by shaping formal legal rules) and
directly (by creating the more diffuse social rules under which we
live). 1 If we mean to take seriously the importance of creating a
meaningful equality of opportunity for political influence as part of
democratic practice, 176 then we are obliged to ask the question:
influence over what? Seeing governance and collective self-determination as a larger and more fluid enterprise points to a broader range
of what we can think of as opportunities for "normative influence"
that is broader than that which democratic theory conventionally
assumes. Put differently, if formal law is not the only mode of social
regulation that exercises significant power over citizens, then it is
problematic for democratic theory to ignore categorically this
expanded range of opportunities for normative influence. Thinking in

Facts and Norms: Contributionsto a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 298 (MIT Press,
1996). As I discuss below, however, the horizontal dimension of democracy that I urge neither
assumes nor depends upon the dialogic ideals associated with Habermas and other theorists of
deliberative democracy. See notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
173. See, for example, Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics at 326 (cited in note 147).
174. See generally Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40 (1983)
(arguing that law operates "in the shadow of coercion" and that courts are "jurispathic").
175. On the formation of social norms generally, see Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and
Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 917 (1996) (In a way social norms reduce freedom,
understood very broadly as the power to do whatever one would like to do."). Sunstein
specifically discusses the ways in which social norms can entrench or reduce social inequalities.
See id. at 908. For an exploration of the complex links between laws and social norms, see
Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2055
(1996).
176. Seeing political equality in terms of equal opportunities for political influence obviously has important implications for democracy's "vertical" dimensions, most clearly in the
realm of campaign finance reform. See generally Symposium on CampaignFinanceReform, 94
Colum. L. Rev. 1125 (1994).
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these terms suggests that social inequalities can be-as opposed to
only cause-democratic inequalities.
When we view the social sphere in this way, the antidemocratic implications of the regime of coerced gay invisibility become
clearer. Social disenfranchisement and caste-like practices severely
limit the ways in which gay men and lesbians can participate in and
influence not only lawmaking processes, but also the more diffuse, yet
quite powerful, processes of collective deliberation that take place in
the social sphere. What people know and think about homosexuality
is necessarily influenced by the social experiences and images
available to them. Prevailing cultural representations and discursive
frameworks regulate how people understand the world around them,
and critically structure social norms and cultural meanings. The
social sphere-Romer's domain of "ordinary civil life"-is an arena in
which uncodified social norms, like those about homosexuality, are
177
forged based on available cultural and epistemological resources.
Maintaining a regime of invisibility, in turn, powerfully shapes social
knowledge about homosexuality by leaving anti-gay attitudes and
animus unchallenged. Opinion polls, for example, reflect that people
who know openly gay people are much more likely to tolerate and
support gay rights and are much less likely to possess the anti-gay
Coerced
animus that Romer found underlying Amendment 2.178
inequality.
gay
reinforce
to
works
thus
invisibility
Romer's stance against caste and the banishing of gay men and
lesbians from ordinary civic life invites us to consider the democratic
implications of coerced social absence. In her recent book The Politics
of Presence,'79 Anne Phillips argues that democratic theory has traditionally been concerned with a "politics of ideas," but that its underlying notion of ideological diversity and representation has recently
been supplanted by a "politics of presence," which is instead concerned with identity group diversity and representation. 8 0 Phillips's
177. I have explored this subject in greater detail in Schacter, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 715-17
(cited in note 34), and Jane S. Schacter, Metadeiocracy: The Changing Structureof Legitimacy
in Statutory Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 618-26 (1995) (discussing "reconstructionist"
theories of democracy and underlying ideas about epistemological pluralism). On the centrality
of narrative strategies to the gay rights struggle, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat
Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and
Gay Men, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 511, 516-37 (1992).
178. See Schacter, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 313 (cited in note 39).
179. Anne Phillips, The Politicsof Presence(Oxford U., 1995).
Demands for "presence"-in the political and social arenas-are
180. Id. at 1-26.
vulnerable to critiques of identity essentialism, to the extent that such demands crudely assume
a necessary and singular link between identity and ideas, such that gay presence is deemed sure
to bring with it a monolithic set of distinctively gay ideas and contributions. See generally id. at
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book focuses on the formal political process, and in that sense it stops
short of the expanded, horizontal domain of democracy that I address
here. But the animating idea of presence as relevant to democratic
thought is at the core of what I find so powerful in the Romer opinion:
some recognition of the devastating consequences of the social erasure
and marginalization of gay lives.
My focus on the democratic character of the social sphere and
the diffuse processes that generate public opinion has affinities with
some of the themes stressed by theorists of deliberative democracy.181
Frank Michelman, in particular, has specifically addressed the
problematic social exclusion of gay men and lesbians in terms of civic
republican theory.182 But there is an important distinction between
my call to recognize the democratic implications of socially
disenfranchising gay men and lesbians and the premises associated
with strong theories of deliberative democracy: one need not share
the deliberative democrat's belief that contemporary American public
culture can be reconstituted as an ideal, public-regarding, political
dialogue in order to see the democratic virtues of rejecting the regime
of coerced gay invisibility.
Widening the frame of politics to
encompass social disenfranchisement carries with it no necessary
belief in the normative or empirical strength of idealized models of
collective deliberation. Indeed, in the context of sexuality debates, it
would be naive to think that increased gay visibility would always be
received with empathy or understanding from other citizens. The
contested contemporary character of gay visibility itself suggests that
9 (discussing the problematic "search for authenticity" created by identity-based politics). More
nuanced ideas about "presence" are beginning to emerge, however, and ideas like these can
move beyond categorical assumptions about groups while still retaining a strong claim for

presence. See, for example, David A. Hollinger, PostethnicAnerica: Beyond Multiculturalism
(Basic Books, 1995) (arguing that advocates of multiculturalism must reconsider some elements

of the doctrine but continue to welcome different ethical and racial backgrounds); Martha
Minow, Not Only For Myself- Identity, Politics and Law (forthcoming 1997).
181. For leading contributions, see Habermas, Between Facts and Norms at 298 (cited in
note 172) (on "political opinion-and will-formation"); Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale
L. J. 1493, 1533 (1988) (arguing for the normative priority of "social plurality" in deliberative
democracy); Sunstein, 97 Yale L. J. at 1580-81 (cited in note 133) (linking republican aspirations, but not republican traditions, to antisubordination norms).

182. In challenging the Bowers ruling based upon his interpretation of civic republicanism,
Frank Michelman argued against sodomy laws on these grounds:
[A]mong the effects of a law like Georgia's on persons for whom homosexuality is an aspect of identity is denial or impairment of their citizenship, in the broad sense which I
have suggested is appropriate to modern republican constitutionalism: that of
admission to full and effective participation in the various arenas of public life. It has
this effect, in the first place, as a public expression endorsing and reinforcing
majoritarian denigration and suppression of homosexual identity. It also-and for my
purposes more interestingly-denies citizenship by violating privacy.
Michelman, 97 Yale L. J. at 1533 (cited in note 181) (footnotes omitted).
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this will not be so. 183 Gay visibility does and should bring a range of
images into the public domain, including images that transgress
traditional gender roles in ways that will disturb and alienate some.
Moreover, some people are hostile to homosexuality in ways and for
reasons that visibility will not dislodge.
My claim does not assume an empathetic political mindset or a
self-conscious communal commitment. I argue, more narrowly, that
coercing social invisibility shapes public understandings and beliefs,
as well as laws, about homosexuality in ways that deny gay men and
lesbians full and meaningful participation in the ongoing normative
enterprise that is a central part of collective life. The invisibility
regime has left the available public iconography of homosexuality
impoverished in ways that bear centrally upon how homosexuality is
understood and assigned public meaning, and that powerfully
function to reinforce normative heterosexuality.
Increasing gay
presence and participation in social life is a vitally important way to
expand the public imagination about the meaning of homosexuality.
For example, making more visible the lives of diversely configured gay
families or the many gay men and lesbians engaged in a wide array of
life pursuits can, by multiplying the available public images of
homosexuality, change for some citizens the very concept of what it
means to be gay or lesbian. Indeed, whether or not change takes
place at any conscious level,84 disrupting the invisibility regime can
enrich the base of social experience and knowledge in ways that will
5
enhance democracy.8
In sum, a principal and distinctive characteristic of gay inequality is disenfranchisement from arenas in which knowledge,
norms, and meanings are collectively negotiated. These public deliberations, though not conventionally denominated as "politics," are an
important aspect of the public processes that generate legal and social
rules about homosexuality, as well as many other aspects of life. Yet
the democratic implications of these processes have been neglected.
Although Romer was not cast in terms of an expanded democratic
domain, the opinion recognized the way that Amendment 2 socially
disenfranchised gay men and lesbians and thus used the Equal
183. See notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
184. See Fajer, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 524-27 (cited in note 177) (discussing the
phenomenon of"preunderstanding" and attitudes toward gay men and lesbians).
185. The fact that citizens would not necessarily regard themselves as engaging in political
activity in "horizontal," non-institutional settings might be problematic for building new ideas
about democracy. See Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 Yale L. J. 1591 (1988). One of
the challenges of building an expanded democratic domain is to think about ways to generate
support for the notion that "ordinary civic life" has significant democratic dimensions.
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Protection Clause to protect a horizontal dimension of democracy as I
have described it here.s6 Viewed from this perspective, Romer
encourages us to reconsider the conventional understanding of
political participation and representation, to explore the consequences
of excluding gay men and lesbians from the complex collective
processes that generate social meanings, and to take seriously the
ways in which coerced invisibility limits the ability of gay men and
lesbians to participate in the broader enterprise of governance.
It is fair to ask whether this is a better reading of Romer-one
that improves upon an interpretation that focuses more
straightforwardly on the constitutional brake on majoritarian
democracy that the Court seemed to be applying. Additionally, one
may ask if there is any reason to think that a court unwilling to
accept a (vertical) Hunter theory would embrace the horizontal
participational norms that I have suggested. Perhaps the best way to
understand what I see as the important possibility Romer opens is
that it challenges us to develop and deepen the links between equal
protection, social equality, and democracy in the horizontal terms I
have sketched out. This challenge can be part of a large and difficult
but important effort to generate more complex ways of thinking about
democracy.
Branding all that is majoritarian as necessarily
democratic ignores the powerful legitimating force of democracy as a
concept. Thus, it is problematic to rely on constitutional constructs
that concede that judicial invalidation of equality-undermining laws is
antidemocratic, even if justifiably so. By contrast, generating more
demanding concepts of equality and participation and situating them
within claims about democracy have promise, in the long run, to serve
better those who continue to struggle for equality and social justice.
Romer, in this and other ways, is very much a beginning and not an
end.
While I have sketched out some directions for thinking about
how the Equal Protection Clause might figure into an evolving jurisprudence more sensitive to issues of democratic equality, many important questions need to be addressed in developing these ideas
further. One task is to begin to disaggregate and explore further the
186. The Equal Protection Clause is by no means alone as a constitutional route to the
presence I am describing. The First Amendment, in particular, also has a central role to play in
enriching the public imagery of homosexuality. For arguments rooted in the First Amendment,
see generally, Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture
(Routledge, 1995); Cole and Eskridge, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 319 (cited in note 20). But
as Amendment 2 and Romer reflect, the Equal Protection Clause has an important role to play
in creating conditions for democracy in ways that the free speech protections, standing alone,
cannot achieve.
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"social sphere" to which I have referred, and to consider how democratic norms should apply to social life. For example, my reading of
Romer raises the question of how other kinds of social disenfranchisement (race- or gender-based, for example) or other forms of nonpolitical disenfranchisement (economic, for example) translate into
ideas about democratic equality.18 7 The litigation challenging the
anti-affirmative-action initiative passed by California's voters in 1996
188
may provide some important early insights into this question.
More fundamentally, the social sphere as an operative concept
in democratic theory is by no means self-defining. The related concept of "civil society" has been deployed in work on democracy and
democratization, but it, too, has its ambiguities.189 Because Amendment
2 and Romer's image of ordinary civic life are my focus, I have
centered on arenas of collective social life addressed by traditional
antidiscrimination laws.
I have meant particularly to include
nominally private spheres made public for some purposes by their
coverage in such laws, including workplaces, housing units, businesses providing credit and insurance, and other public accommodations, in addition to more uncontroversially public settings, like
schools. 90 My purpose has been to explore the democratic character of
these settings, but it would be unwise to use antidiscrimination laws
as an exclusive point of reference for defining those areas of collective

187. Professor Abrams's contribution to this Symposium considers invisibility and
inequality in other contexts. Kathryn Abrams, The Supreme Court, Visibility, and the "Politics
of Presence",50 Vand. L. Rev. 411 (1997).
188. See Tim Golden, U.S. Judge Blocks Enforcing of Law Over Preferences, N.Y. Times Al
(Dec. 24, 1996) (discussing initial stages of litigation challenging the initiative).
189. For example, two recent works exploring links between civil society and democracy
define civil society in different ways. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato offer a descriptive
definition of the term. See Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and PoliticalTheory at ix (cited in
note 172) ("We understand 'civil society' as a sphere of social interaction between economy and
state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of
associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public
communication."). By contrast, Ernest Gellner insists that the term be more normative. Ernest
Gelner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals 211 (Hamish Hamilton, 1994) ("Civil

Society is a notion which serves a double function: it helps us understand how a given society
actually works, and how it differs from alternative forms of social organization. It is a society in
which polity and economy are distinct, where polity is instrumental but can and does check

extremes of individual interest, but where the state in turn is checked by institutions with an
economic base; it relies on economic growth which, by requiring cognitive growth, makes
ideological monopoly impossible). See also id. at 5-6 (criticizing definition that posits civil
society as antidote to domination by the state but does not contemplate other potential sources
of domination). Many contemporary accounts build on the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. See

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Knopf, 1945).
190. Of these areas, the workplace has been most subject to theorizing about democracy.
See Carole Pateman, Participationand Democratic Theory 45-66 (Cambridge U., 1970); Simon,
Democracy and SocialInjustice at 244-46 (cited in note 5).
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social life that should be embraced within an expanded conception of
democracy. Focusing only on these contexts would be underinclusive
in omitting important arenas not subject to conventional
antidiscrimination laws-some large and diffuse, such as the realm of
mass media

and popular

culture; 191 others

small and highly

family. 192

At the same time,
concentrated, such as the realm of the
employing antidiscrimination law as a benchmark would also be overinclusive in light of the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston. 93 In that
case, the Court rejected the application of a state antidiscrimination
law to compel the organizers of the St. Patrick's Day parade in Boston
to include a contingent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers. 194 By
upholding the expressive liberties of the parade organizers, Hurley,
which was decided only a year before Romer and was unanimous,
suggests at the very least that Romer cannot be understood to stand
for an undifferentiated democratic right to gay social presence. 19 5
Thus, Romer and the context in which it arises bring to the
foreground some of democracy's horizontal dimensions by rejecting
the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from ordinary civic life, but
cannot generate any exhaustive or universal definition of those aspects of social life that may be proper objects of democratic theory.
The inquiry may shift in important ways in different circumstances.
This leads me to a final, but important point. In analyzing
Romer, I have focused on the role of courts in developing constitutional principles of democratic equality. As Romer itself suggests,
courts, by virtue of their structure, political insulation, and reflective
191. See, for example, Jim Cullen, The Art of Democracy: A Concise History of Popular
Culture in the United States (Monthly Review Press, 1996); Douglas Kelner, Television and the
Crisis of Democracy (Westview Press, 1990); Benjamin Page, Who Deliberates? Mass Media in
Modern Democracy (U. of Chicago, 1996).
192. See Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory at 538-41 (cited in note 172);
Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family 134-70 (Basic Books, 1989); Frances E.
Olsen, The Family and the Markek A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1497 (1983).
193. 115 S. Ct. 2338, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487 (1995).
194. 115 S. Ct. at 2351.
195. Contrast Hurley with other first amendment cases decided by lower courts that affirm
a notion of gay "presence" by recognizing the right of gay student groups on college campuses to
be recognized. Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp. 1548, 1553 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (holding that statute that prohibits state college from spending public funds on groups
that "foster" or "promote" a lifestyle or actions prohibited by sodomy laws is unconstitutional);
Gay Lib v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848, 854-55 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that refusal of
university to recognize homosexual student group violates the First Amendment); Gay Students
Organizationof Univ. of New Hampshire v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652, 662 (1st Cir. 1974) (holding
that a university's prohibition against gay organization's social functions violates the First
Amendment).

1997]

DEMOCRACY'S DOMAIN

409

capacities, have an important role to play in identifying and helping
to secure the conditions of democracy as they interpret open-textured
constitutional commands like the Equal Protection Clause. But the
judicial role is decidedly limited and constrained in several ways. It is
surely a mistake to expect judges to exercise what Michael Klarman
calls a "heroic countermajoritarian function."196
Courts are
significantly constrained by the presence or absence of social
consensus; it is exceedingly difficult, for example, to imagine the
Supreme Court deciding Romer before the Stonewall riots.
In
addition, courts see only a tiny number of cases in relation to the
massive scale of politics.197 And constitutional interpretation only
goes so far.
Consider Romer itself. The decision removes a formidable
obstacle in the path of gay civil rights laws, but it does not mandate
that any such laws be enacted. That battle must be fought in the legislative arena. If gay civil rights laws are to play an important role in
eradicating the coerced invisibility and continuing subordination of
gay men and lesbians, the political process will have to play an important role in bringing that about. There are also significant functions
here for the market. In fact, an increasing number of corporate employers are adopting antidiscrimination policies in the absence of
laws, and IBM recently joined a growing list of companies offering
domestic partnership benefits (like health insurance coverage) to gay
1 98
employees and their partners.
The vision of democratic equality I have sketched out, moreover, must go beyond the realm of rules, for laws and policies of any
kind can play only a partial role in more fully enfranchising gay men
and lesbians in collective social life. The media and other forms of
popular culture, for example, are involved in powerful though complex
ways in shaping public understandings and social knowledge, and
they must also figure centrally in securing democratic equality for gay
men, lesbians, and others still relegated to the American social margins.19 9

It is important to think about these multiple arenas because it
helps to clarify the distinctive yet inevitably partial role for courts. It
also suggests that the ideas about democratic equality I have set out

196. Michael J. Kiarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
Va. L. Rev. 1, 2, 6 (1996).

See also Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 198-215 (cited in note

152).
197. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives at 213, 260 (cited in note 152).
198. See Gay Rights, CorporateStyle, Bus. Week 170 (Oct. 7, 1996).

199. See Schacter, 110 Harv. L. Rev. at 723-30 (cited in note 34).
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are not ideas only about the Equal Protection Clause and the way it
should be understood. Instead, the very notion that democracy's
domain extends horizontally beyond the formal political process
means that ideas about democratic equality need to be engaged in
many spheres simultaneously. In the end, Romer can powerfully
enable, but cannot itself deliver, meaningful democratic equality for
gay men and lesbians.

